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This article reexamines existing limitations on the use o/contingent consideration
in tax-free corporate acquisitions. Analyzing thefinancial role of contingent consid-
eration, it proposes new, less restrictive guidelinesfor the Internal Revenue Service,
the courts, and practitioners. The article argues that these less restrictive rules ac-
cord with both the need to permit the reorganization f corporate enterprises and the
current tax law which taxes sales of business enterprises.
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THE USE of contingent consideration in corporate acquisitions
has received scant scholarly attention from tax lawayers. 1 The
lack of academic scrutiny belies the importance of the device and
its theoretical interest in the tax law. Contingent consideration,
the contractual provision for a flexible price term in corporate ac-
quisitions, is the principal means employed to allocate and reduce
risk and uncertainty in reorganizations.2 The sources of contem-
porary apathy are several. The promulgation of relatively broad
revenue procedures that allow affirmative rulings on use of contin-
gent and escrowed stock,3 revenue rulings that have upheld the
use of sophisticated convertible stock,4 and an accounting shift
that has reduced interest in such sophisticated devices5 have all
combined to draw critical attention from the tax treatment of
many forms of contingent consideration in acquisitive reorganiza-
tions. Despite the absence of contemporary attention, the law of
contingent consideration is riddled with inconsistencies and out-
1. Those commentators who have focused on the question have usually addressed
only one aspect of the broader problem. For example, several commentators have ana-
lyzed the treatment of contingent and escrowed stock. See Dailey, The Voting Stock Re-
quirement of B and C Reorganizations, 26 TAX L. REv. 725 (1971); Murphy, Contingent
Share Reorganizations, 1969 S. CAL. TAX INST. 255; Tillinghast, Contingent Stock Pay-Outs
in Tax-Free Reorganizations, 22 TAX LAW. 467 (1969).
2. Although it is possible to distinguish between risk as the condition in which possi-
ble outcomes comprise a vector matrix, with a probability assigned to each possible out-
come, and uncertainty as the condition in which the outcomes cannot be assigned a
probability, that sophistication is unnecessary for the present task. Accordingly, risk and
uncertainty will be employed interchangeably.
3. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
4. E.g., Rev. Rul. 73-205, 1973-1 C.B. 188 (voting, convertible stock with contingent
conversion ratio).
5. For example, the requirement that earnings per share reflect potential dilution
through conversions. See Accounting Principles Board, Opinion No. 14 (1969). Perhaps
even more important are the limitations that have been placed on the use of pooling of
interest accounting. See-Accounting Principles Board, Opinion No. 16 (1970).
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right contradictions.' The status quo is maintained only by ad-
ministrative fiat and sub rosa resolution of the difficult theoretical
issues. The purpose of this article is to highlight the doctrinal
problems and propose new solutions.7
The sources of uncertainty in corporate acquisitions are many,
but they may be roughly grouped in the following four types.
First, the scale economies that the resulting combination will yield
may be uncertain. When the size of the pie is itself uncertain, the
allocation of shares must be uncertain, too. Second, if the consid-
eration passed in the acquisition is of uncertain value, the parties
may want to provide for a second look at the price of the acquisi-
tion. This is often the case if the acquisition involves stock with-
out a market value. Third, the shareholders of the acquired
corporation may be uncertain as to the future policies of the new
management and seek the protection of an additional payout if
the management adopts certain policies. Fourth, the parties may
be uncertain as to the performance of warranties made in the ex-
change and provide for a variation in the price term of the acqui-
sition as a form of liquidated damages. Any of these uncertainties
may induce the parties to provide for contingent consideration in
the acquisition."
The sources of the doctrinal problems are two. The first is the-
oretical. The reorganization law premises a reorganization trans-
action. The paradigmatic case is a single event at which time the
rights of the parties, including both corporations and their share-
6. Although serious doctrinal problems also exist in the treatment of divisive reorga-
nizations, those problems will not be explicitly addressed here. See, e.g., Gordon v. Com-
missioner, 424 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970). There are two reasons
for this exclusion. First, the need for contingent consideration in most divisive reorganiza-
tions is much less significant; thus there is less need to provide in the tax law for such
devices to meet bona fide business needs. Second, many of the theoretical problems are the
same. The analysis developed here in the context of acquisitive reorganizations can, in
many cases, be applied to divisive reorganizations as well.
7. Because of the task of this article, some basic familiarity must be presumed with
subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code (and the reorganization provisions thereof in
particular) and with corporate finance. No attempt will be made here to define the basic
financial instruments or the basic reorganization tax concepts.
8. The parties may attempt to allocate and reduce risk with devices other than con-
tingent consideration. For example, they may provide for indemnification or for arbitra-
tion. In some sense, such rights will constitute contingent consideration. Similarly, back-
out rights on certain events may be characterized as contingent consideration. See B. Brrr-
KER & J. EusTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
14.56 (3d ed. 1971). For the purposes of this article, however, "contingent consideration"
will designate only those devices employed when no price term is fixed, all the above de-
vices presume a fixed price term and provide for modification if that term proves unhappy.
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holders, are rearranged. In the case of a reorganization in which
uncertainty requires the use of contingent consideration, no such
discrete transaction occurs. Instead, the exchange takes place
within the context of a contractual relationship with the ultimate
interests determined only after the passage of time. The theoreti-
cal problem, then, is how to cope with an ongoing exchange rela-
tionship in a statute structured for discrete exchange transactions. 9
It is this theoretical problem which has underlain the more appar-
ent practical problems of contingent consideration.
The second source of difficulty has been the emergence of two
separate and inconsistent lines of authorities. The first follows
Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp.t° and prohibits contin-
gent consideration in an apparent attempt to accord only ex-
change transactions nonrecognition under reorganization law.
The second follows Carlberg v. United States."I That case permits
the introduction of contingent consideration in the form of contin-
gent stock. While the opinion draws some principles from South-
west Consolidated, it is generally more sympathetic to the need to
reduce uncertainty in these transactions. Although these two lines
of authority appear inconsistent, that inconsistency has not been
remarked in the literature.' 2 Part of the task of this article is to
make out the claim that the contradiction is real. 3
9. For a discussion of this distinction, see I. MAcNEIL, CONTRACTS 68-72 (1969).
10. 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
11. 281 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960).
12. Most courts and commentators seem to assume that the law of contingent consid-
eration, while arcane and highly formal, is fundamentally consistent. E.g., Carlberg v.
United States, 281 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960); Gordon v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 1032 (1969),
a#-d, 424 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970); B. BITrKER & J. EusTIcE,
supra note 8, 14.31, .56.
13. It is important at the outset to note the limits of this project. The current law of
the taxation of stock warrants and contingent consideration is well developed and complex.
The attempt here is only to analyze the problem as a subchapter C problem. Two problem
areas would become of special interest if the reforms proposed herein were to become
effective. The first is the proper scope of I.R.C. § 483 with regard to contingent considera-
tion. The Internal Revenue Service takes the position that contingent consideration is taxa-
ble as ordinary income under § 483. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(b)(6), example (7), T.D. 6873,
1966-1 C.B. 101, 106 (contingent stock); accord, Rev. Rul. 73-298, 1973-2 C.B. 173; Rev.
Rul. 72-35, 1972-1 C.B. 139 (§ 483 applicable to contingent stock payout in B reorganiza-
tion); Rev. Rul. 72-32, 1972-1 C.B. 48 (§ 483 applicable to contingent stock payout in A
reorganization); Rev. Rul. 70-300, 1970-1 C.B. 125. But see Treas. Reg. § 1A83-1(b)(6),
Example (8), T.D. 6873, 1966-1 C.B. 101 (§ 483 not applicable to contingent consideration
paid through escrow arrangement); accord, Rev. Rul. 70-120, 1970-1 C.B. 124 (escrowed
stock not subject to § 483).
The courts have only recently reached the question of the applicability of § 483 to con-
tingent consideration in reorganizations and have consistently held that the provision is
applicable and the Commissioner's regulations are valid. Solomon v. Commissioner, 67
[Vol. 29:88
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The first stage establishes the existence of two inconsistent
lines of authorities, that following Southwest Consolidated and
that following Carlberg. Second, the fundamental theoretical
problems are analyzed. On the basis of the general, theoretical
analysis, new rules are proposed for the application of the nonrec-
ognition and basis provisions. Fourth, the possible tax avoidance
opportunities-seemingly important in the Service's view 4----are
critically examined. The article then examines the law as it exists
today for the practicing lawyer and how this analysis can offer
some avenues for safely exceeding the current ruling guidelines on
contingent consideration. A conclusion points out the need for,
and the availability of, reform.
I. Two LINES OF AUTHORITIES IN THE TAXATION OF
CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION
A. The Southwest Consolidated Line
The first line of authorities for the taxation of contingent con-
sideration is the dominant one. 5 Derived from the principal au-
thority of Southwest Consolidated,'6 this line has informed the
decisions of the lower courts' 7 and the Service." The issue in
T.C. 379, 385-86 (1976), aft'd, 570 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1977) (§ 483 applicable to a contingent
stock payout in a B reorganization); Jeffers v. United States, 556 F.2d 986, 993-97 (Ct. Cl.
1977) (contingent stock payout in A reorganization subject to § 483; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.483-1(b) upheld); Catterall v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 413, 419-22 (1977) (§ 483 held
applicable and the regulations under I.R.C. § 483 upheld in the case of a B reorganization).
See also Cocker v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 544, 560-61 (1977).
Prior to a resolution of the matter in the courts, there was much discussion of the provi-
sions, much of it critical, in the secondary literature. Eg., Berger & Kanter, Does Imputed
Interest Rule Apply to Reorganizations?, 39 J. TAX. 127 (1973); Berger & Kanter, Problems
in Computing Interest on Contingent Payments, 23 J. TAx. 191 (1965); Clark & Kascle,
Proposed Imputed Interest Regulations:A4 Critique of the Non-Routine Areas, 23 J. TAx. 66
(1965).
The second problem is the proper treatment of warrant lapse. Current law requires the
corporation issuing warrants to recognize gain on their lapse. Rev. RuL 72-198, 1972-1
C.B. 223 (modified as nonretroactive, Rev. RuL 77- 40, 1977-1 C.B. 248; further modified
by Rev. Rul. 78-73, 1978-9 I.R.B. 18). If either of those positions is correct--and both are
extremely problematic, as a matter of theory-they significantly affect the use of contin-
gent consideration in reorganization. Those complex problems are not within the scope of
this article.
14. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 66 -34, 1966 -2 C.B. 1232.
15. The broad application of this line is probably attributable in part to its source in
the Supreme Court and in part to the expansive language of the Southwest Consolidated
opinion. See, eg., B. BrrKER, & J. EusTicE, supra note 8, 14.31, at 14-76 to 79.
16. 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
17. Eg., Gordon v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848
(1970); William H. Bateman, 40 T.C. 408 (1963), appeal dismissed, (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1964).
But see Clark v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1947) (warrants for debentures
permitted in an insolvency exchange).
18. Eg., Treas. Reg. § 1.354 -l(e) (1955). See B. BIrrKER & J. EusncE, supra note
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Southwest Consolidated was whether voting stock warrants could
be received in a tax-free reorganization under the predecessor to
section 368(a)(1)(B)."9 The Court, per Justice Douglas, held that
nonrecognition treatment was unavailable for any of the gain real-
ized under the exchange because the transaction did not qualify as
a reorganization. Justice Douglas reasoned that the voting stock
requirement of the statute was absolute. "'Solely' leaves no lee-
way. Voting stock plus some other consideration does not meet
the statutory requirement. . . . [T]he acquisition in this case was
not made 'solely' for voting stock."2 The opinion thus empha-
sizes the "plain meaning" of the statute. Justice Douglas re-
marked three reasons why voting stock warrants were not
themselves voting stock., First, the rights of the warrant holder
were purely contractual. Second, correspondingly, the warrant
holder acquired no property rights in the underlying shares or in
the assets of the corporation. Third, the remedy for the violation
of the warrant holder's rights lay in money damages; under no
circumstances could he compel the delivery of the shares.22
The argument may be formalized as follows: (1) the statute
requires that only voting stock be given in a B reorganization as
consideration for control of the acquired corporation; (2) voting
stock warrants are not voting stock; (3) therefore this is not a B
reorganization. This reasoning requires the answers to two ques-
tions. First, what are the rights of the parties immediately after
the exchange? Second, are those rights identical to those which
are allowed to be exchanged? 3 If those rights do not match ex-
actly in a potential B or C reorganization, then deny reorganiza-
tion status to the entire transaction. Thus does the approach look
at the form of the transaction rather than the substantive rights of
8, 14.31, at 14-75. But see Pressed Steel Car Co., 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 868 (1944), qfl'dper
curiam, 152 F.2d 280 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 838 (1946), in which it was the
Service that argued warrants could be received in a nonrecognition exchange under the
reorganization provisions.
19. 315 U.S. 194, 196 (1942). The predecessor statute is reproduced in id. at 196.
20. Id at 198-201.
21. Id. at 200-01.
22. Id
23. Although there is no explicit requirement in the opinion that the bundle of rights
received be identical to the ordinary rights constituting stock or voting stock, such a re-
quirement is consistent with the tenor of the opinion. See id. at 200-01.
[Vol. 29:88
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the parties and follow the statutory language rather than the statu-
tory purpose. Justice Douglas stated baldly:
[I]t makes no difference that, in the long run, the unexer-
cised warrants expired and nothing but voting stock was out-
standing. The critical time is the date of the exchange. In that
posture of the case, it is no different than if other convertible
securities had been issued, all of which had been converted
within the conversion period. 24
Such an analysis never raises the following questions. First, does
the exclusivity requirement apply to all consideration or only to
property? Second, when are the tax consequences properly deter-
mined? Third, when is an exchange complete? Justice Douglas'
opinion presupposes that exclusivity applies to all consideration,
that tax consequences are determined immediately, and that an
exchange is complete when the initial exchange is complete.
These premises, however, are not supported by argument.2 5
There are two possible interpretations of this opinion. Both
begin with the premise that the formal model is, on its face, a
complete model for the treatment of contingent consideration in
24. 315 U.S. at 201.
25. The gaps in Justice Douglas' opinion can be explained on either of two theories.
The first suggests that Justice Douglas was all too frequently willing to decide tax cases
based solely on his subjective preferences. The failure to support the reasoning regarding
warrants in Southwest Consolidated would seem to be only one more example. B.
WOLFMAN, J. SILVER & M. SILVER, DissENT Wrr T OPINIoN 131-35 (1975). The sec-
ond would emphasize the similarity between the issue presented in Southwest Consolidated
and issues presented to the Court in Consolidated Rock Prods. v. Dubois, 312 U.S. 510
(1941). In that case, some commentators have suggested that Justice Douglas, a former
SEC chairman, took the opportunity of a case involving an insolvency reorganization to
warn the investment community of the hazards of stock warrants. If Justice Douglas were
so concerned at that time with the hazards of stock warrants, he may well have acted to
reduce the use of such instruments in tax-free reorganizations by imposing the heavy tax
burden resulting from the Southwest Consolidated decision.
But Southwest Consolidated is understood today as offering authority not only for the
holding that stock warrants will not qualify as stock, Gordon v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d
378, 382-83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970); William H. Bateman, 40 T.C. 408,
414-15 (1963), appeal dismissed, (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1964), but also for the proposition that
stock warrants will not qualify as securities, Treas. Reg. § 1.354-1(e) (1955). See B. Brrr-
KER & J. EusTicE, supra note 8, 14.31, at 14-75. Originally, the opinion was not read
nearly so broadly. Even before Southwest Consolidated the Board of Tax Appeals in E.P.
Raymond, 37 B.T.A. 423 (1938), had held under a predecessor statute that warrants would
qualify for nonrecognition. After the Supreme Court opinion, however, there remained
some uncertainty regarding the scope of the decision. For example, the Service argued that
in the context of an insolvency reorganization warrants were permitted. Pressed Steel Car
Co., 3 T.C.M. (CC-) 868 (1944), a'dper curiam, 152 F.2d 280 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 328
U.S. 838 (1946). The Eighth Circuit, in an insolvency reorganization, held that warrants
received by debenture holders were entitled to nonrecognition of gain or loss. Clark v.
Commissioner, 162 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1947). Thus, it would seem, Southwest Consolidated
was initially read far more narrowly than it is today.
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corporate reorganizations.26 The first interpretation would con-
strue the holding in Southwest Consolidated that the statutory lan-
guage leaves no leeway in its specification of permissible
consideration to limit consideration to those rights which most
fundamentally constitute "voting stock." Under this view any
right of conversion, because it does not inhere in the concept of
voting stock, would constitute impermissible consideration and
disqualify a potential B reorganization. In a statutory merger or
consolidation, by contrast, the presence of such a right would con-
stitute boot.27 Thus on this reading of Southwest Consolidated, be-
cause the classes of consideration entitled to nonrecognition are
fundamentally classes of interests comprised of fixed rights, all
contingent consideration comprised of time variant28 rights would
be disqualified.29
A more limited reading of Southwest Consolidated would ex-
clude only those interests separate from, rather than appurtenant
to, qualifying interests. In the case of qualifying stock, a conver-
sion privilege would not constitute boot because it would be ap-
purtenant to the qualifying interest.30 By contrast, an otherwise
qualifying stock interest coupled with a separately negotiable
stock warrant would fail to qualify.3 ' On this interpretation of
Southwest Consolidated, although some forms of contingent con-
sideration would be permitted, no forms which were not parasitic
upon qualifying interests would qualify. In particular, contingent
stock, escrowed stock, and stock warrants would all seem to fail to
qualify.3 2 It is unnecessary to choose between these two interpre-
tations of the opinion because the task here is simply to describe
the present law. Whichever interpretation is more nearly accu-
rate, both interpretations agree that the Southwest Consolidated
26. Technically, of course, the holding in Southwest Consolidated goes only to the
qualification of stock warrants as voting stock in a B reorganization; the holding is only one
of multiple grounds of decision. See 315 U.S. at 199-201.
27. Whether the conversion right would disqualify the stock interest from nonrecogni-
tion entirely or whether the boot would be valued solely with regard to the value of the
right of conversion itself is an open question.
28. That is, simply, the rights will vary over time as the contingencies are or are not
realized.
29. Whether such disqualification would cause all or only a portion of the gain to be
recognized would depend upon the statutory context.
30. See Rev. Rul. 75-33, 1975-1 C.B. 115 (contingent dividend rights not boot be-
cause inherent in qualifying stock interest); Rev. Rul. 73-205, 1973-1 C.B. 188 (convertible
preferred with floating conversion ratio).
31. See Rev. RuL 70-108, 1970-1 C.B. 78.
32. This, of course, is not the law in that by administrative action the Service has
permitted in limited measure contingent and escrowed stock.
[Vol. 29:88
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opinion,33 written as it is in general terms, provides a comprehen-
sive scheme for contingent consideration.
Representative of the judicial authorities which follow South-
west Consolidated are William H. Bateman34 and Gordon v. Com-
missioner.35 In Bateman, stock warrants were transferred to the
shareholders of a nonsurviving corporation in a merger. Since the
transaction qualified as a reorganization under section
368(a)(1)(A) of the Code, the issue before the court was whether
the warrants were stock for the purposes of section 354(a)(1). 36
Citing Southwest Consolidated, the court held that stock warrants
were not stock and therefore not entitled to nonrecognition. 37 In
Gordon, the issue before the court was whether, in a D reorganiza-
tion, warrants qualified as "stock or securities. 38 Citing South-
west Consolidated, the court held that the warrants were not
stock.39 The court refused to reach the question whether such
warrants constituted securities on the argument that, even if secur-
ities, the receipt would be taxable on the peculiar facts of this ex-
change.4° Thus the holding in Southwest Consolidated has been
extended judicially to reach stock warrants in A and D reorgani-
zations.
More important, the Service has construed Southwest
Consolidated broadly. The first important Service interpretation
of the Southwest Consolidated decision came in its 1955 regula-
tions interpreting sections 351, 354, and 355.41 The Service held
that stock options and warrants would qualify neither as stock nor
as securities for the purposes of those provisions. Thus the hold-
ing of Southwest Consolidated that voting stock warrants did not
qualify as voting stock in section 368(a)(1)(B) was enormously ex-
tended in scope. The Service has since consistently applied the
provision broadly. In Revenue Ruling 57-586,42 the Service ruled
that the receipt of the Carlberg certificates of contingent interest in
a statutory merger would not be entitled to nonrecognition of in-
33. 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
34. 40 T.C. 408 (1963).
35. 424 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970).
36. 40 T.C. at 408.
37. Id at 415.
38. 424 F.2d at 381.
39. Id at 382.
40. Id
41. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.351-1(a)(1), T.D. 6942, 1969-1 C.B. 136; 354-1(e); .355-1(a).
42. 1957-2 C.B. 249.
1979]
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come. That decision was overruled by the Eighth Circuit in
Carlberg, but the Service continues to hold a restrictive interpre-
tation of the permissible place of contingent consideration in reor-
ganizations. In Revenue Ruling 7&-108, 43 the Service ruled that
convertible preferred stock which entitled its holder to acquire an
additional share on conversion for a cash payment (in effect, an
attached warrant) did not constitute voting stock. The citation,
again, was to Southwest Consolidated.' Most recently, the Service
ruled in Revenue Ruling 78-40841 that warrants could not be ex-
changed tax-free for outstanding warrants in a reorganization.
Thus the Service has repeatedly applied Southwest Consolidated to
prohibit contingent consideration in diverse types of reorganiza-
tions. The claim of Southwest Consolidated to hegemony in the
theory of contingent consideration was challenged, however, by
the Carlberg decision.
B. The Carlberg Line
There is no comparable statement of a functional interpreta-
tion of contingent consideration; this is in part probably due to the
commanding position of Southwest Consolidated as a statement of
the formal law.' Nevertheless, a functional approach is clearly
embodied in the revenue procedure outlining the Service ruling
policy on contingent stock4 7 and in an opinion by Justice (then
Judge) Blackmun on contingent stock.48 In Revenue Procedure
77-37, the Service issued its current guidelines for the treatment of
contingent stock.49 That guide allows the use of contingent stock
in all types of reorganizations50 subject to certain limits relating to
the relative magnitude of the use."' Those limitations are con-
43. 1970-1 C.B. 78.
44. Id at 79.
45. 1978-47 I.R.B. 11.
46. See notes 15-25 supra and accompanying text.
47. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
48. Carlberg v. United States, 281 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960).
49. 1977-2 C.B. 568. The first procedure guideline was issued as Rev. Proc. 66-34,
1966-2 C.B. 1232.
50. That procedure makes no distinction between qualifying contingent stock as vot-
ing stock and qualifying contingent stock simply as stock. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B.
568.
51. Those restrictions are (I) all stock must be issued within five years of the initial
exchange; (2) there must be a valid business reason for the arrangement; (3) the maximum
number of shares must be stated, (4) the interest in the contingent shares must in fact be
nonnegotiable; (5) the shares ultimately to be received must be qualifying; and (6) 50% of
the total share must be issued at the outset. Id.
[Vol. 29:88
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cerned both with maintaining the substance of the transaction as a
tax-free reorganization and barring the use of contingent consid-
eration as a tax avoidance tool. 2 Although Congress probably
did not envision the use of contingent consideration when it en-
acted the reorganization provisions,5 3 the Service sought to con-
strue the statute with regard to the general purpose, the financial
realities of reorganization exchanges, and the appeal of horizontal
equity. Thus the guidelines treat reorganizations under uncer-
tainty like reorganizations without uncertainty.54 Where the pro-
cedure departs from a functional interpretation of the statute is in
its failure to take account of the statutory scheme and its failure to
consider the propriety of the brightline rules it adopts. 5
The second representative of the functional approach is the
opinion in Carlberg v. United States.56 The contingent considera-
tion presented was contingent stock. 7 At issue was whether such
an interest was boot or stock. The government argued that South-
west Consolidated controlled. 8 As a matter of interpretation, the
government was probably right. 9 But while following the formal
model in some important respects, the court deviated sufficiently
from it to reach a contrary result.6 0 Writing for the court, Justice
52. See B. BrrrKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 8, 14.56; Murphy, supra note 1; Til-
linghast, supra note I.
53. No mention is made of the possibility in the committee reports for the 1934 Reve-
nue Act, which enacted the voting stock restriction for what are now B and C reorganiza-
tions, nor in the revision of what is now § 354 in the 1954 Code. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 704,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-15 (1934); S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1934); H.R.
REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-41, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 4017, 4064-66. Nor is there any discussion of the problem in the secondary litera-
ture that suggests that Congress ever directly considered the problem.
54. The Service ignores in this context the objection, found telling against the receipt
of warrants, that the receipt of an interest that itself is nonqualifying (like contingent stock)
is not legitimized by the fact that the interest initially received is a dynamic interest and
will either be transformed into a qualifying interest or will lapse. Instead, the Service sim-
ply glossed over this objection. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
55. Thus it would seem that if contingent stock qualified, there would be no support
for arbitrary limits that require that 50% of all stock be initially issued or that all stock be
issued within five years.
56. 281 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960).
57. The contingent stock was evidenced by negotiable "Certificates of Contingent In-
terest." Id at 510.
58. 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
59. For an analysis of the Southwest Consolidated line of authorities, see notes 26-33
supra and accompanying text.
60. Justice Blackmun followed the formal model of Southwest Consolidated both in
holding that the rights of the parties immediately after the exchange determined the tax
consequences and in relying on highly formal (and seemingly trivial) differences in the
instruments. One principal difference Justice Blackmun relied upon was that a warrant
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Blackmun followed the earlier Supreme Court decision in holding
both that the time of the exchange determined its tax conse-
quences and that such an exchange would be deemed to occur on
the first transfer of rights: "Certain other principles merit mention.
The situation at the time of the merger and not that as of any later
date is controlling or, as the Supreme Court has said, 'The critical
time is the date of the exchange.' ,61
Justice Blackmun departed from precedent by looking to the
statutory purpose and to the substance of the rights:
We also feel that the merger agreement and the provisions
of the Certificates are properly interpreted and analyzed not
alone within the limitations of their language (possible conflict-
ing results as to which are well illustrated by the arguments of
the opposing litigants here) but in the light of other and deeper
considerations, namely, purpose, practicality, precedent and
substance. 62
In particular, Justice Blackmun noted the place of substance of
the transaction in determining tax consequences:
It has often been said in tax arguments, and occasionally
decided, see Gregory v. Helvering. . .; Commissioner v. Court
Holding Co...; Kanawha Gas & Utilities Co. v. Commis-
sioner. . .; that substance must prevail over form. If this ob-
servation has any independent legal force or merit in the
determination of tax causes, it compels a conclusion that the
substance of the Certificates equates only with stock .... The
rule of substance over form, therefore, this time operates in the
taxpayer's favor.63
In so doing, he held that contingent stock qualified as stock.' 4
Thus the Carlberg decision adopted a functional approach by
looking to the substance of the transaction, taking note of the eq-
uities, and considering the statutory purpose.
Justice Blackmun, compelled to follow Southwest
Consolidated65 if it controlled, attempted to distinguish it.66 It ap-
pears that the two cases are indeed inconsistent, notwithstanding
gives its holder a right that he must affirmatively exercise, whereas a contingent stock right
operates automatically. Careful drafting can overcome that difference, however, so it is
difficult to understand why such a difference should play an important role in determining
tax consequences.
61. 281 F.2d at 514 (citation omitted). In important respects, such as the timing of the
determination of tax consequences, Justice Blackmun may well have felt bound by
Supreme Court precedent.
62. Id at 518.
63. Id at 519-20 (citations omitted).
64. Id at 520.
65. 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
66. 281 F.2d at 516-17.
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the attempt to distinguish.67 Southwest Consolidated excludes vir-
tually all contingent consideration. Moreover, subsequent cases
have confirmed the inconsistency. The courts have repeatedly
been confronted with the government analogizing to Southwest
Consolidated and the taxpayer analogizing to Carlberg.68 Repre-
sentative of these cases is James C. Hamrick.6 9 There, in the con-
text of a section 351 nonrecognition claim, the instrument at issue
was a contractual right to receive additional shares for property
contributed to a controlled corporation.70 The Tax Court sided
with the taxpayers, noting the "obvious differences" between such
instrumental rights and the warrants of Southwest Consolidated.7"
Like the Carlberg court, the Tax Court emphasized the require-
ment that the shareholder act affirmatively and the positive exer-
cise price for the warrants but, like the earlier court, could not
explain why those distinctions ought to make a difference. The
only option available was to proceed by analogy, with the closer
analogy governing the case. In Hamrick, the court concluded that
the contingent interest was more akin to that permitted in
Carlberg than to that barred by Southwest Consolidated.
Of the subsequent authorities in the Carlberg line, the Service
treatment of contingent and escrowed stock72 has been described
above. The Hamrick case,73 which follows Carlberg in its analysis
of contingent consideration, has also been presented. These con-
stitute the principal authorities in the Carlberg line. Also impor-
tant, if less direct progeny of Carlberg, are the revenue rulings that
permit convertible stock. Revenue Ruling 73-20574 described a B
reorganization that provided for contingent consideration in the
form of a floating conversion ratio for voting convertible preferred
stock. The Service, citing the ruling that approved the Hamrick
67. See notes 26-33 supra and accompanying text.
68. Eg., Gordon v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 378, 381, 382 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 848 (1970); James C. Hamrick, 43 T.C. 21 (1964), vacated and remanded per
stpulation, 1966-1 U.S. Tax Cas. T 9322. The status of Hamrick is seemingly problematic.
Although the Tax Court decision was vacated and remanded by the court of appeals pursu-
ant to agreement of the parties, the Service subsequently acquiesced in the decision. While
Hamrick is technically not good authority for any proposition, it is regularly cited as au-
thority, e.g., Jeffers v. United States, 556 F.2d 986 (Ct. Cl. 1977), and does represent the
Service position. See Rev. Rul. 66-112, 1966-2 C.B. 68.
69. 43 T.C. 21 (1964).
70. Id at 33.
71. Id
72. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
73. 43 T.C. 21 (1964).
74. 1973-1 C.B. 188.
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result,75 held that such contingent consideration was qualified and
did not bar reorganization status.76 Southwest Consolidated was
conveniently ignored. In general, then, Carlberg has governed
contingent and escrowed stock and convertible preferred stock.
Southwest Consolidated has governed stock options and warrants
even when those rights are attached to otherwise qualifying instru-
ments.77
C. Uncertainty and the Possibility of Reform
There are three principal sources of uncertainty in the current
treatment of contingent consideration in tax-free reorganizations.
First, little regard is paid to the statutory scheme which divides
consideration into voting stock, stock, and securities78 for the pur-
pose of determining tax consequences. For example, the Service
ruling guidelines on contingent stock make no distinction between
qualifying such contingent stock in an A or B reorganization.79
Second, there is clear inconsistency among many of the Service
positions on the use of contingent consideration and the decisions
of the courts. At least arguably, none of the contingent considera-
tion payouts that have been permitted by the courts would qualify
for an advance ruling from the Service. 0 Third, because of the
inconsistent paradigms for the treatment of contingent considera-
tion and the two lines of authorities in which they are embodied, a
new instrument must be of uncertain tax status. Which paradigm
will be applied and which analogy between stock warrants and
contingent stock will be found controlling is not always obvious.8"
75. Rev. Rul. 66-112, 1966-1 C.B. 68.
76. Rev. Rul. 73-205, 1973-1 C.B. 188, 189.
77. The treatment of convertible preferred stock has also been governed by Carlberg,
even if issued in a putative B reorganization. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-205, 1973-1 C.B. 188.
78. The relationship between the term "stock" and the term "securities" is by no
means perspicuous. Thus one interpretation has been that the term "stock and securities"
ought to be construed as a single term. But whether that approach be adopted, it should be
noted that "securities" does not ordinarily include within its scope "stock," in the Internal
Revenue Code.
79. If it seems that such a distinction would be unduly academic, consider that on the
crucial issue of voting rights, contingent stock does not carry voting rights. This would
surely seem to make a very real difference in the measure of voting stock and other stock.
80. The exchange in McAbee v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1130, 1132-42 (1945), would
have violated the 50% rule and the nonnegotiability rule. The Carlberg deal violated the
five-year rule, the stated maximum rule, the 50% rule, and the nonnegotiability rule. 281
F.2d at 511-13. The Hamrick transaction violated the five-year rule and the nonnego-
tiability rule. 43 T.C. at 22-31.
81. Eg., Gordon v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848
(1970) (litigation to determine whether warrants failed to qualify as "stock or securities").
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These three factors combine to produce significant uncertainty in
the treatment of contingent consideration in reorganizations.
The uncertainty of the current law, then, is one of the prag-
matic criticisms that may be made of the current treatment of con-
tingent consideration. But the problems run deeper than the
uncertainty that survives the third of a century since Southwest
Consolidated. The present doctrine itself is open to criticism.
First, the presence of the two, inconsistent lines of authorities evi-
dences the incoherence of the contemporary treatment. Any re-
form of the current law must make a serious attempt to restore
consistency. Second, as indicated above, the contemporary law
takes little account of the statutory trichotomy for consideration
(voting stock, stock, and securities) in reorganization. Greater
fidelity to law is required in this respect. Third, and probably
most important, is the failure to realize the broad statutory policy
favoring the tax-free reorganization of corporate enterprises. As
noted in the introduction, the arbitrariness of the current law has
hampered many exchanges simply because of the uncertainty con-
fronting the parties attempting to negotiate a corporate acquisi-
tion. Reform of the current law must seek a greater fidelity to the
statutory purpose.
II. THE THEORY OF THE TAXATION OF CONTINGENT
CONSIDERATION
The potential use of contingent consideration in tax-free cor-
porate acquisitions poses three fundamental problems. The first
problem created by contingent consideration is that of determin-
ing when the tax consequences of a reorganization exchange are
derived. Although the problems are not entirely novel, they are
raised in a peculiarly acute form by contingent consideration.
When a transaction is deemed closed for the purpose of tax deter-
minations is, after all, the problem which the step transaction doc-
trine attempts to resolve.82 That doctrine discounts the
discreteness of the form in which a series of transactions is cast to
determine tax consequences only with respect to the parties' final
posture.8 3 While the limits of that doctrine are by no means
82. See generally American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397, 405-08 (1948), af'd, 177
F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950).
83. The consolidation is generally urged when, as in 4merican Bantam, the taxpayer
can derive more attractive tax results by treating certain stages in a single business plan as
separate for application of the nonrecognition provisions. See 11 T.C. at 405-08.
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clear,8" the puzzles created by contingent consideration, with its
time variant rights, are of another order of magnitude. For each
transaction in which contingent consideration is employed, the
parties have not only the actual rights they hold at the completion
of the initial exchange, but a set of potential rights which may or
may not qualify as property, 5 and a set of potential future rights.
When tax consequences are determined may well decide the tax
status of a transaction.
The second problem is that of determining the bundle of rights
which is examined to determine tax consequences. Because con-
tingent consideration gives its holder time variant rights,86 this
problem is not so simple as with ordinary forms of consideration.
In the formal model it is the rights held immediately after the ex-
change that determine the tax consequences;87 in the functional
model (at least arguably) it is the rights held after the substantial
completion of the exchange.88 In the current blackletter law, this
means that steps that are deemed to occur automatically (e.g., the
issuance of additional contingent stock) are considered part of the
exchange, while contingent consideration vesting the right of exer-
cise in the holder is deemed to carry additional rights beyond
those received in the exchange.89
To solve the puzzle of which bundle of rights is properly iso-
lated to determine tax consequences in a statute premised upon
exchange transactions rather than exchange relationships" re-
quires a close analysis of the statutory purpose. It must be deter-
84. For a survey of some of the problems remaining, see Hobbett, The Step Transac-
tion Doctrine and Its Effect on Corporate Transactions, 19 TUL. TAX INST. 102, 123-38
(1970); Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. INST.
FED. TAX. 247 (1954) (1939 Code).
85. In some open transactions, the rights will only be contractual, as, for example, the
right to reserved shares.
86. See note 28 supra.
87. See Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 201 (1942).
88. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
89. See Carlberg v. United States, 281 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960).
90. See note 9 supra. The problem of the adequacy of the statute to deal with reorga-
nizations under uncertainty is a theme that runs throughout this article and is explicitly
addressed in the conclusion. The courts, by their willingness to adopt the restrictive Serv-
ice interpretations and their plaintive appeal to the "plain meaning" of the statute, are
either indifferent to the plight of these taxpayers or convinced that the current statute is
unable to handle these problems and that Congress must provide the solutions by amend-
ment. While amendment would indeed be a simple means by which to resolve these
problems, it also seems possible to effect reform at the judicial and administrative levels. In
this sense, it will be urged that although the legislators did not explicitly address the
problems of contingent consideration, this statute, construed by careful courts, can handle
these problems.
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mined whether the various restrictions on consideration in
reorganizations exclude only interests that are substantially differ-
ent from qualifying interests or whether the restrictions exclude
interests which differ at all.91 If the former construction be cor-
rect, then a convertible debt instrument which embodies substan-
tially an equity interest ought to qualify as stock; if the latter
construction be correct, then the interest would fail to qualify as
stock.92
The third theoretical question that has arisen for contingent
consideration is the importance of the traditional distinction be-
tween property and contract. At first impression the distinction
seems irrelevant. But the Service has emphasized the distinction
by proposing to rule affrmatively on contingent consideration
which is nonnegotiable while indicating that it will deny such rul-
ings for negotiable interests.93 This distinction is apparently
founded on the distinction of Carlberg that a contingent right to
receive additional shares of stock, a contract right, is different
from a stock warrant, a property interest.94 Developing this unar-
ticulated doctrine and evaluating the importance of the distinction
in this context is the third task here.
91. Surprisingly, this fundamental question has not been asked by the courts or by the
commentators. See, ag., Carlberg v. United States, 281 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960); Dailey,
supra note 1.
92. The possibility of a substantial equivalence test is reinforced by the adoption by
accountants of the concept of equity equivalents in the treatment of hybrid instruments.
Accounting Principles Board, Opinion No. 14 (1969). The possibility of establishing a con-
cept for the tax law of substantial equity equivalence has also been suggested by the Special
Committee on Reorganizations of the Tax Section of the New York State Bar. See B.
BrrTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 8, 14.31, at 14-73.
Although the current law is clear in its resolution of this problem, that resolution has
not been defended. See Rev. Rul. 69-91, 1969-1 C.B. 106 (convertible debentures disqual-
ify a transaction as a B reorganization).
93. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
94. The language of the statute states that the exchange must be solely for voting
stock. What the statute does not explicitly provide is whether stock control (or the assets in
a C reorganization) must be acquired solely in consideration for voting stock or solely in a
property exchange for voting stock. The crucial difference is that the former would exclude
all forms of consideration other than voting stock; the latter would seemingly exclude only
other forms of property. The difference, then, would be the treatment of bare contractual
rights. Insofar as certain forms of consideration are simply contractual rights, and not
property, how this section is interpreted will have an important effect on the delineation of
the scope of stock and assets acquisitions. The Service, of course, firmly takes the position
that the restriction in § 368 runs to all bargained-for forms of consideration, not just prop-
erty, and has established that position in some courts. E.g., Mills v. Commissioner, 331
F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1964). But see Dailey, supra note 1, at 776-77.
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A. Timing the Determination of Tax Status
Although the problems of when to determine the tax conse-
quences of a putative reorganization exchange are by no means
simple, by first resolving those questions it is possible to proceed
to the even more troubling problems of defining how time variant
rights ought be treated. The problem is most troubling because
the theoretical issues are so unusual. In most exchange transac-
tions which give rise to tax consequences, the transaction is dis-
crete rather than continuous. 9 So the tax law relating to the
treatment of such continuous, time variant rights is not well devel-
oped, and there remain basic theoretical puzzles. The threshold
question for contingent consideration is whether such considera-
tion has been realized as income by the exchanging shareholder.96
Absent realization, there can be no question of whether the gain
or loss ought to be recognized.
In select corporate acquisitions, there may be no realization of
the contingent consideration by the recipients.97 In those cases re-
alization must await the arrival of the contingencies; until the
claims mature, there is no income. But there is good reason to
believe that the class of transactions which will be styled "open"
in this sense is very limited. First, it is today recognized that the
taxpayer whose income is reported under the open transaction
doctrine receives a tax windfall.98 Second, the Service has sought
to restrict the scope of the doctrine.99 Third, and perhaps most
important, many forms of contingent consideration will fail to
qualify for the application of the doctrine under the Service ap-
proach that has been upheld in the courts."° For that narrow
95. Of course, most taxable events probably occur within an ongoing exchange rela-
tionship. See I. MAcNEIL, supra note 9, at 170-72. Nevertheless, such events are usually
sufficiently discrete to be characterized as transactions. For a classic example of a taxable
transaction in the context of an exchange relationship, see Commissioner v. Duberstein,
363 U.S. 278 (1960).
96. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 68-71 (1977). Whether the
realization requirement is a mere administrative requirement or a constitutional restriction
on the federal income tax power has been a matter of dispute. Compare Eisner v. Ma-
comber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) with M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra, at 68-71. Professor Chirel-
stein's view that realization is a device to make the application of the income tax to
appreciation in assets practicable, by requiring roughly that any increase in value be vali-
dated by an arm's-length transaction, is today more widely accepted. Id at 68.
97. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 96, at 243. I have found no cases or rulings in which
the income has been reported in this manner.
98. Id at 242.
99. Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 15.
100. See, e.g., Frizzelle Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 737, 744 (1974), aff'dper
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class of transactions that falls within its scope,10' the taxpayer
need report no gain until he has recovered his basis. This will
almost never occur in the payment of contingent consideration, so
the taxpayer will simply reduce his carryover basis in the other-
wise qualifying reorganization exchange. If this doctrine solves
the problem of when to determine the tax consequences of certain
transactions-only upon a delayed realization-for the bulk of
contingent consideration acquisitions, the threshold requirement
of realization will be met. The problem then of when to deter-
mine recognition must be faced.
There are at least three potential choices. First is the standard
of Southwest Consolidated which tests the interests immediately
after the exchange. Any future rights then held disqualify either
the transaction or the consideration received, depending upon the
statutory context."0 2 On this view it is the initial, not the final or
any intermediate, rights which determine the tax consequences.
Second is an approach like that of the step transaction doctrine
which seeks to examine the intent of the parties and the function
of the transaction to assess the economic and financial realities of
a transaction or series of transactions to determine the tax conse-
quences. Under this test an exchange with contingent considera-
tion would be completed, at the latest, when the rights of the
parties had reached what would remain substantially their final
form. In the case of contingent stock, the transaction would be
complete when the shareholder had received in the exchange sub-
stantially all the stock to which he was entitled. Of course, this
test might be difficult to administer because the parties might have
received substantially all the consideration that they would ulti-
mately receive but remain unaware of that fact until the termina-
tion of the period for the issuance of contingent consideration. So
long as there remained a possibility of significant additional rights
for any party, the exchange would not be substantially com-
curiam, 511 F.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1975) (fair market value of warrants held to be determina-
ble).
101. For example, the transaction described in James C. Hamrick, 43 T.C. 21, 23
(1964), vacatedandremandedpersifulation, 1966-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9322, falls within that
class. Stock and contingent rights to additional stock were received in exchange for un-
tested patents in the organization of a corporation. See also M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note
96, at 242.
102. Boot ordinarily disqualifies the entire transaction for a B reorganization or a C
reorganization. See I.R.C. § 386(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(B). Boot is permitted, although
taxed, in an A reorganization. Id (a)(1)(A).
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plete.° 3 The third test for determining which interest defines tax
consequences would examine the rights ultimately held by the
parties after the final adjustments had been made. Under this ap-
proach, the presence of contingent consideration would be effec-
tively ignored because tax consequences of the exchange would
not be determined until all the contingent consideration had
lapsed.' °4
The problem of determining when tax consequences are to be
decided is principally a problem of the intended scope of the non-
recognition provisions. There are two possible interpretations of
that scope. The first, more limited interpretation is that the gen-
eral rule of recognition in the Code is paramount and that the
statutory exceptions to that rule are to be read narrowly. 105 On
that view, the absence of provision for a period during which tax
determination may be suspended is dispositive10 6 The qualifica-
tion for nonrecognition must be determined upon the realization
of income. Absent qualification, the general mandate of recogni-
tion applies.'07 The second interpretation is that the paramount
policy of recognition has been suspended in the case of reorgani-
zations.'0 8 As the treasury regulations show, under this interpreta-
tion, the policy of nonrecognition is paramount'0 9 and the
remedial provision of the nonrecognition provisions must be read
broadly to effect the statutory relief intended. This view might be
read either to require the suspension of determination until the
substantial completion of the exchange or even until all revisions
103. See text accompanying notes 115-21 infra. A somewhat stricter version of this test
would close the exchange when substantially all the property the parties would ultimately
receive had been transferred. The difference, of course, is that such a test would ignore, for
the purpose of determining tax consequences, the presence of contractual rights of conver-
sion vested in the exchanging shareholder or escrowed stock held by the shareholders as
beneficial owners. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
104. This approach has apparently not been adopted in any reported ruling or case.
While it is possible (and helpful) to distinguish for our purposes between determining
which interests are to qualify and when the determination is to be made, those two ques-
tions are indeed closely related and frequently indistinguishable in the opinions. See, e.g.,
Carlberg v. United States, 281 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960).
105. See, e.g., Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes andRealisrm, 71 HARV. L. REv. 254, 264-65
(1957).
106. Thus nonrecognition of gain is appropriate for up to 18 months after the sale of a
principal residence under I.R.C. § 1234 even if no replacement has yet been made because
that period of contingent nonrecognition is provided under the statute.
107. I.R.C. § 1002.
108. The reorganization provisions are, on this argument, special provisions which
override the general mandate of I.R.C. § 1002.
109. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b), l(c) (1960).
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of interests are finally complete. 110
Neither general position is free from doubt, but the stronger
position seems to be that which urges that tax consequences are
determined only upon the substantial completion of the exchange.
The argument that nonrecognition is unavailable unless immedi-
ately available on realization of income seems open to three prin-
cipal objections. First, the treasury regulations themselves seem to
reverse the usual presumption in favor of recognition of income
on corporate reorganization."1 I Second, to hold that the nonrec-
ognition provisions must be read so narrowly seems inconsistent
with the statutory intent to provide broad relief." 2 Third, al-
though in other nonrecognition provisions Congress has provided
explicitly that recognition be suspended pending a determination
of qualification, given the strong statutory policy favoring nonrec-
ognition of income on corporate reorganization, no statutory pro-
vision ought to be necessary to achieve the same result here.'1 3
The argument for deferring the determination of tax conse-
quences until the exchange is final and complete seems open to
strong objection, too. First, such a rule would permit taxpayers to
abuse the nonrecognition provisions by casting their transactions
in a form as if they might finally qualify, with the intent only to
postpone the tax. This would allow the taxpayer a significant tax
deferral advantage. Second, the practical problems for such a sus-
pension of tax determination would be insoluble. Accounting for
the basis of interests disposed of in the interim, for example, could
not be resolved. In short, to suspend the determination of the tax
status of a transaction for perhaps five or more years" 4 would be
grossly impractical. The conclusion that a general determination
of deferral cannot be adopted in reorganizations does not entail
that a limited deferral rule, operative only if contingent considera-
tion takes the form such that ultimate interests will be interests
themselves initially permissible, may not be appropriate.
The best choice for the time at which to determine the tax con-
sequences of a putative reorganization is the substantial comple-
110. The substantial completion of the exchange was apparently the test adopted in
Carlberg when Justice Blackmun looked to what the parties had at the time the contingent
stock lapsed.
111. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b), 1(c) (1960).
112. See generally Hellerstein, supra note 105, at 258-61.
113. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 1233, 1234. For the argument to the opposite conclusion, see note
107 supra.
114. The Carlberg contingent stock payout, for example, exceeded five years in dura-
tion, as did the Hamrick exchange. See note 80 supra.
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tion of the exchange. This rule accords with the step transaction
doctrine, the remedial intent of Congress, the treasury regula-
tions,'15 and the requirements of administration. Determination
upon substantial completion accords with these other doctrines
because it reduces the possibility of taxpayer manipulation of the
incidence of taxation and taxes transactions according to their
substance rather than their form. There are difficulties, of
course.' 16 Such a rule will require that certain exchanges remain
open for a limited period, until they are substantially complete. It
is probably within the power of the Service, in theory" 7 and in
fact, 118 to issue regulations which require the determination of tax
consequences within a year or eighteen months after the initial
exchange.' 19 Such regulations would both serve the needs of ad-
ministration and prevent the potential abuse of tax deferral. Of
course, such a rule would conflict with the holding in Southwest
Consolidated.20 Insofar as that holding seems without support,
inconsistent with the statute, and long eschewed by the courts and
Service in the treatment of contingent and escrowed stock,' 2 ' such
conflict seems inescapable. Ordinarily contingent consideration
would neither have yielded a final interest nor lapsed at the time
the determination is made. If contingent consideration is to qual-
ify in reorganizations, it must ordinarily do so by virtue of the
qualification of the contingent interest.
B. The Problem of Time Variant Rights
The problem of taxing time variant rights-the paradigm of
which is convertible securities-is a far more limited problem in
115. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b), l(c) (1960).
116. For a discussion of the basis problems engendered by contingent consideration,
see Section V infra.
117. See I.R.C. § 7805.
118. In practice, Service regulations have ordinarily withstood challenge in the courts.
See e.g., United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1967).
119. A year would give the parties some flexibility in their transaction and is a natural
period; the 18-month period is taken from the deferral period of I.R.C. § 1034 for the
exchange of a principal residence. At present, the possible duration of exchange relations
pursuant to a plan of reorganization is uncertain. In D.W. Douglas, 37 B.T.A. 1122, 1128
(1938), an exchange five years after the initial exchange was deemed to fall within the scope
of the nonrecognition provisions; in W.N. Fry, 5 T.C. 1058 (1945), an exchange six years
after the parties entered into a plan was held to qualify. But it would seem, nonetheless,
that the Service has the power to restrict such indefinite duration by rule. Murphy, supra
note 1, at 260-61.
120. 315 U.S. at 201.
121. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. For a review of the historical development of
the analysis of Southwest Consolidated, see note 25 supra.
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the law than that of deciding when to determine tax conse-
quences. 122 But the problems, as Arthur Fleischer, Jr. and Wil-
liam L. Cary demonstrated," are very difficult as a matter of tax
theory. Just as they showed that no single theory of convertible
securities could account for the tax law in that field, 124 so we have
seen that the treatment of such time variant rights in reorganiza-
tion exchanges is informed by inconsistent theories. But if the tax
problems of convertibles are not generally to be solved by a single
theory, there is a solution in the case of reorganizations. In order
to realize the statutory purpose and to construe the current statu-
tory language, it is necessary to read the terms of the statute with
regard to their function. There is a broad policy requiring inves-
tors to keep their interest at risk after an exchange at least in the
same measures as before the exchange.'25 If that policy is para-
mount, then a contingent interest that comprises an unqualified
senior interest 126 coupled with a potential junior interest will not
qualify because the senior interest insulates the holder from a
measure of the enterprise risk. By contrast, those forms of contin-
gent consideration that fail to provide such insulation would not
seem disqualified. 27
The statute provides, in its nonrecognition provisions, that an
investor may not increase (substantially) his seniority in the capi-
tal structure of the corporation in reorganization.1 28 A financial
analysis of many forms of convertible securities issued as contin-
gent consideration in reorganization shows that the presence of a
senior interest is designed to achieve precisely that "uphill" con-
version. 129 The contingent consideration may take the form, for
122. The problem of determining when to tax a transaction is a problem which runs
through the accounting cases, the deferred compensation cases, and the installment sales
cases, among others.
123. Fleischer & Cary, The Taxation of Convertible Bonds andStock, 74 HARV. L. REv.
473 (1961).
124. Id at 522.
125. This article will describe the reorganization policy that an investor not be permit-
ted to effect a significant uphill conversion in his interest (one aspect of the continuity of
interest requirement) as a requirement that the investment remain "at risk." No reference
is intended thereby to whether the interest is on a recourse or nonrecourse basis as does the
use of that term in I.R.C. § 465. See generally Dailey, supra note 1, at 733-34.
126. For example, debt. See Rev. Rul. 69-91, 1969-1 C.B. 16 (convertible debt).
127. For example, stock warrants.
128. Indeed, the requirements for a B reorganization may force exchanging sharehold-
ers to sacrifice some of their seniority in an exchange in which they receive voting common
for their nonvoting preferred. I.R.C. §§ 354, 368(a)(l)(B). See Dailey, supra note 1, at 734.
129. This term is borrowed from D. HEmwrrz, BusINEss PLANNING 293 n.* (1966). B.
BrrrKER & J. Eus;=Ec, supra note 8, T 14.12, at 14-28 to 29, employ the term "upstream."
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example, of nonvoting preferred convertible into voting common
stock at a floating rate tied to the future profits of the corpora-
tion.1 30 Or the contingent consideration may take the form of
debt convertible into common stock with the conversion ratio tied
to the corporate performance.13 ' In both cases, the initial, senior
interest, nonvoting preferred and debentures, respectively, ought
not qualify as voting stock. The role of the senior interest in the
convertible is to provide the holder with additional protection
against potential enterprise risk.' 32 Accordingly, under the gen-
eral statutory requirement that the investor be allowed to shield
no part of his interest without recognizing gain thereon, such an
interest ought not to be held to qualify for nonrecognition.
This argument from analogy to the nonrecognition provi-
sions 133 faces, with regard to voting stock, two principal chal-
lenges. First, the nonrecognition provisions apply only to
reorganizations. Should their rule be applicable to determine the
threshold question of whether an exchange qualifies as a reorgani-
zation? Second, the recognition rule of section 356 reaches only
the portion of gain that is converted uphill, whereas the section
368 sanction would be recognition of all gain. This suggests that
looking to the rules of sections 354 and 356 will yield far too harsh
a result. ' 34
One answer to these challenges is to look at other possible
treatment for convertibles. Qualification might be allowed on a
substantial equivalence test.135 That is, if a sufficient measure of
the value of the convertible were constituted by the qualifying in-
terest, then the instrument would qualify. The recognition of gain
might be computed on any of three theories. First, the entire in-
strument might be deemed to qualify and no gain would be recog-
nized. This theory would seem the only one available for voting
stock because the presence of any recognizable gain would dis-
qualify the entire transaction. 36 Second, gain might be deferred
130. For example, the instrument described in Rev. Rul. 73-205, 1973-1 C.B. 188.
131. For example, the instrument described in Rev. Rul. 69-91, 1969-1 C.B. 106.
132. Seegenerall, M. TENNICAN, CONVERTIBLE DEBENTURES AND RELATED SECURI-
TIES (1975) for a readable and sophisticated analysis of the finance of these instruments.
133. I.R.C. §§ 354, 356.
134. Of course, neither argument would tell against the application of this analysis with
regard to qualification of convertibles as stock or securities under §§ 354, 356.
135. See Accounting Principles Board, Opinion No. 14 (1969) (standards for equity
equivalence for the computation of earnings per share); note 5 supra.
136. That conclusion might not be reached were it possible to distinguish between de-
termining that there is boot for the purposes of applying § 354 and determining that there
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until a determination whether the conversion right was exercised.
If not, then gain in the full amount would be recognized. 37
Third, some attempt might be made to apportion the value be-
tween qualifying and nonqualifying interests, with recognition of
gain only to the extent of an unqualified interest. Both of the last
two strategies appear administratively impracticable and to open
broad avenues for tax avoidance.'3 8 These problems could be re-
duced by establishing a brightline test of the suspension pending
conversion, after which a failure to convert would be conclusively
presumed. Such a test could be coupled with a strong burden of
proof on the taxpayer in the allocation of value. 139 Yet even with
these two strategies, if the apportionment approach were adopted,
taxpayers would probably make all their nonqualifying interests
convertible, in the hope of persuading the Service that some por-
tion was entitled to nonrecognition. The result would be an inor-
dinate drain on Service resources.
Practically, then, it seems that there is no feasible alternative to
barring initially nonqualifying interests, even if convertible into
qualifying interests."4° The broad rule against permitting initially
is boot for the purposes of§ 368. But that is a difficult argument to make in this statutory
context and has not prevailed (if indeed it has ever been made) in the courts.
137. In theory, that gain should be recognized retroactively to the year of the exchange,
with interest payable thereon, in order to avoid possible distortion from tax bracket shifts
for the taxpayer and to minimize the deferral advantage.
138. The third proposed rule would be difficult to administer and would encourage
taxpayers to set an excessive value on the conversion privilege. Cf. Chock Full O'Nuts
Corp. v. United States, 453 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1971) (no allocation of issuing price of con-
vertible bonds to conversion feature in determining the original issue discount). The sec-
ond rule could encourage taxpayers to set up sham conversion privileges in an attempt to
defer taxation.
139. Such rules would seem within the scope of the Commissioner's rulemaking power.
See I.R.C. § 7805(a).
140. The rule as stated here does not incorporate a distinction that makes a difference
in the current law, whether the right of exercise or conversion is at the discretion of the
holder of the instrument or is vested in the corporation, controlled by automatic tests. See,
ag., Carlberg v. United States, 281 F.2d 507, 512-13, 517 (9th Cir. 1960). That distinction
has not been defended in the literature, and at first glance seems no more persuasive than
the other formal elements by which Justice Blackmun distinguished contingent rights to
receive stock from stock warrants. But there is perhaps more support for the distinction. If
the conversion is at the option of the corporation, or even if the conversion is triggered
automatically by certain conditions, then the instrument will function less effectively for
the investor as a straddle, a means by which the investor can protect himself against risk
while holding open the possibility of participating in future enterprise success. Instead, the
instrument looks much more as if the intent of the parties is simply to build some flexibility
into the valuation of the interest exchanged in reorganization.
Although an instrument convertible or exercisable only at the option of the corporation,
or automatically upon certain contingencies occurring, will function less effectively as a
straddle because the conversion may occur when the holder would choose not to convert or
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nonqualifying convertibles because of potential qualification upon
conversion may also be defended affirmatively on the argument
that the continuity of interest requirement is a requirement that
the exchanging shareholder keep his investment at risk.' 4 1
Current reorganization law treats stock warrants much like
other convertible securities.' 42 The above analysis shows why that
position is inaccurate: stock warrants do not carry any senior in-
terest that violates the voting stock requirement. Stock warrants
function, financially, as a super-junior security in the capital struc-
ture. 143 They do not give their holder a straddle consisting of a
more senior interest and a potential, more junior interest. There is
little purpose served in barring their receipt on a formal analysis
that they are not voting stock.'" Indeed, if the above analysis of
the timing of the determination of tax consequences be correct,
such a formal argument is not cogent because the premise that tax
consequences must be determined upon realization of income is
false. 145 Instead, it is entirely consonant with the statute to qualify
these interests, absent an impermissible uphill conversion.
The current treatment of stock warrants may derive from a
misunderstanding of their financial function. 146 The nature of the
stock warrant 147 and its pricing148 have only been understood rela-
tively recently, even by financial analysts themselves. Previously,
would fail to convert when he would choose to do so (and similarly for warrants), the
differences are slight, and could largely be overcome by skillful drafting. Such careful
drafting of the operative provisions of these instruments could cloak as automatic conver-
sions instruments which gave the holder a large measure of control. While the Service
might well be able to penetrate to the substance of the transaction, even that substance
would be elusive because the holder would undoubtedly be willing to forego many rights
he might otherwise have obtained in an arm's-length bargain in order to obtain nonrecog-
nition. See also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). So, the difference would be a
difficult one to make out. Finally, it would seem that most of the bona fide sources of
uncertainty in acquisitions presented in the introduction herein could be accommodated
without requiring an unqualified, senior interest. Absent a clear business need, the tax law
can be made simpler to administer by excluding such instruments, whoever holds the con-
version power.
141. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.354-1(e) (1955).
143. See generally M. TENNICAN, supra note 132.
144. But see Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
145. See notes 102-21 supra and accompanying text.
146. Such an explanation presumes that Justice Douglas misunderstood the role of
stock warrants; that seems unlikely. Even today Justice Douglas' fundamental premise that
stock warrants are very tricky instruments remains true. See, e.g., Klein, The Convertible
Bond'4 Peculiar Package, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 547 (1975); L. Loss, 1 SECURiTIES REGULA-
TION 184-86 (2d ed. 1961).
147. See generally M. TENNICAN, supra note 132.
148. See id; Samuelson, Rational Theory of Warrant Pricing, 1965 INDUS. MANAGE-
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it might have appeared that a warrant holder held a participation
measured in the amount of his ultimate participation should he
exercise the warrant. The warrant was the means by which he
could insulate a large part of his (potential) investment from ini-
tial risk-apparently much as the holder of a convertible deben-
ture could insulate a portion of his investment. What this
characterization mistakes is the measure of the holder's participa-
tion and the seniority of the interest he holds. The value of the
warrant itself measures the value of the exchanging shareholder's
continuing participation, and it is a most junior participation in-
deed, riskier even than the common stock. If the holder chooses
to exercise the warrant, he reduces the uncertainty but increases
the investment at risk. Accordingly, the exercise of the warrant is
not analogous to the conversion (downhill) of a security.
Whatever the source of the current doctrine, it is inconsistent with
the modem understanding of stock warrants.
The second possible source for this treatment of stock
purchase warrants may lie in the asymmetry that would seem to
be required if warrants are permitted to be acquired in exchange
for stock in reorganization. Under present law, it is impermissible
for a shareholder to acquire warrants for stock,'4 9 impermissible
for him to surrender warrants and options in exchange for
stock,150 and impermissible to exchange warrants for warrants. 151
On the analysis offered above, although it ought to be proper to
allow warrants to be received, to allow nonrecognition on their
tender for stock would indeed permit an uphill exchange. More-
over, there seems to be no statutory support for the distinction our
analysis would seek to draw between tender and receipt.' 52 Be-
cause the exchange of warrants for stock would constitute an up-
hill exchange, it ought not to be permitted. The principal barrier
to uphill exchanges is the continuity of interest requirement which
ought to be applied by the Service and the courts153 to prevent
MENT REV. 13. See generally B. MALKIEL & R. QUANDT, STRATEGIES AND DECISIONS IN
THE SECURITIES OPTIONS MARKET (1969).
149. 315 U.S. at 201.
150. Rev. RuL 72-198, 1972-1 C.B. 223. See also James C. Hamrick, 43 T.C. 21 (1964),
vacated and remanded per stipulation, 1966-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9322.
151. Rev. RuL 78-408, 1978-47 I.R.B. 11.
152. The only statutory provision of such a type is that of I.R.C. § 354 which allows
receipt of stock for securities, but not securities for stock.
153. Such a continuity of interest requirement would hold that the uphill conversion to
a more senior position would be improper, just as in Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v.
Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 470 (1933), receipt of short-term notes for stock was im-
proper.
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such an exchange. In any event, this problem ought not to be very
serious because a taxpayer who seeks to acquire the stock in the
exchange can simply exercise his warrants prior to the ex-
change. 15 4
C. Contract Rights and Property Rights
The third puzzle for contingent consideration in reorganiza-
tion is whether casting such consideration in the form of contrac-
tual rights, rather than as nonqualifying property rights, ought
also to disqualify the exchange in the context of B and C reorgani-
zations or trigger recognition of gain in the context of an A reor-
ganization. The Service position, upheld in the courts, 55 requires
that control in a B or C reorganization be obtained solely in ex-
change for voting stock, thus operating to exclude any other con-
sideration. The alternative reading would be that the prohibition
goes only to other property transferred. There is support for both
interpretations. From the Service perspective permitting unquali-
fied contractual rights would encourage taxpayers to cast boot as
contract rights. The Service sees an increase in administrative
costs and a potential for illicit boot if the bar is not absolute. Op-
ponents may urge that contract rights ought not to be disqualified
because a contract right will not constitute realized income for a
cash basis taxpayer 156 and thus that such future income ought not
to be considered in determining the tax status of a current transac-
tion. They may point out that if the requirement of exclusivity for
the B and C reorganizations were construed to extend to contract
rights and if a right to receive additional shares were cast as a
contract right, 1 7 such an interest would disqualify the entire
transaction from reorganization status. To the extent that taxpay-
ers might well attempt to disguise unqualified property interests as
contractual rights, the Service surely has the better argument that
154. To the extent that the holder can so exercise, it suggests that this problem will not
often come to court and further that there is little improper in such a conversion. To that
extent a court might not choose to apply the strong continuity of interest requirement de-
scribed in the preceding note.
155. See, e.g., Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 196 (1942).
156. See generally M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 96, at 205-08.
157. Seemingly, the Service requirement that contingent interests be nonnegotiable im-
plicitly relies on the notion that contingent consideration is only a contractual right and
therefore does not constitute either property or income when received in reorganization
exchanges. This rule is also supported by a general reluctance to allow interests which can
be converted into cash without loss of immediate enterprise control or equity participation.
For a discussion of whether that analysis is sound, see notes 256-64 infra and accompany-
ing text.
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such a potential for abuse must be barred absolutely. But to the
extent that such a prophylactic rule would bar from reorganiza-
tion treatment exchanges that otherwise should qualify, it is un-
fair.
The proper test to enforce the at risk requirement of the statute
would be to require that the contractual right be to a performance
which, if received in the initial exchange, would qualify for non-
recognition.' 58 Additionally, if the contract right is to an imper-
missible performance (one which would be boot if received
initially) and if that right must vest or lapse prior to substantial
completion of the exchange, then no boot should be deemed to
have been received.
It is finally possible to offer some tentative theoretical conclu-
sions on the proper treatment of contingent consideration in reor-
ganizations. The previous section explored the limitations of the
current law. The first step in reform is to understand that the de-
termination of the tax status of a potential reorganization ex-
change need not be made at the moment the first income is
realized. The rule of Southwest Consolidated, repeated all too
often, is mistaken. 59 Instead, the tax consequences of a putative
reorganization ought to be determined only upon the substantial
completion of the exchange. 60  While these two rules will not
often yield different results, those differences are significant.' 6'
Second, and more important, the terms of the statute should be
interpreted in their context. In the context of a statute which re-
quires that investors remain at risk, 62 the term "voting stock"
158. But see Dailey, supra note 1, at 776 (distinguishing between inducements to enter
into a reorganization and consideration for the exchange therein).
159. Eg., Carlberg v. United States, 281 F.2d 507, 514 (8th Cir. 1960).
160. What will constitute substantial completion of a reorganization exchange can be
resolved in either of two ways. By administrative or legislative action, a brightline test may
be adopted. An exchange might be deemed complete, for example, one year after the first
consideration changed hands or after 80% of the total consideration planned in the ex-
change had been negotiated. See text accompanying note 106 supra. Alternatively, the
courts might articulate a standard on a case-by-case method, looking to the needs of ad-
ministration, the intent of the parties, the business purpose of the contingent consideration,
and other related factors. It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate which would be
the better approach to this problem.
161. For example, in a B reorganization the exchanging shareholders receive a contin-
gent right to a large cash payment within one year of the exchange if litigation does not go
to a successful conclusion. The substantial completion rule will not disqualify the ex-
change but will instead wait to see if the payment is made, before determining the tax
status of the transaction.
162. This is the requirement of continuity of interest, articulated in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.368-1(b) (1955), and the requirement of I.R.C. § 354.
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should be construed to include voting stock warrants, contingent
voting stock, escrowed voting stock, and similar interests. But be-
cause of the fundamental at risk requirement of the statute, those
convertible interests that carry an initially unqualified, more se-
nior interest, ought not to be held to qualify. Third, neither the
Service nor the courts ought construe the statute to bar contractual
consideration in B and C reorganizations. To the extent that these
theoretical analyses open tax-avoidance abuses, the continuity of
interest doctrine and the Gregory analysis seem sufficient to con-
trol taxpayers. 163 Having resolved the fundamental theoretical
problems, it is now possible to review the application of those gen-
eral rules to the three classes of consideration articulated in the
statute. 1
64
III. THE PRACTICE OF TAXING CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION
A. Nonrecognition of Loss and Gain on the Exchange
1. Voting Stock
Congress enacted the "solely for voting stock" restriction for
stock and asset acquisitions in 1934.111 That restriction has
proved remarkably durable. It has also proved problematic and
seemingly poorly drafted. 66 Although the legislative intent was
clearly to restrict the scope of reorganization status, 167 there re-
mains substantial uncertainty even today regarding the precise
import of that particular provision. The problems of the provision
have been carefully and systematically explored by Richard R.
Dailey.'68 It is sufficient here to note that the provision is very
likely over- and under-restrictive; the requirement will bar at-
tempts to acquire a corporation in which a large part of the stock
is nonvoting by an exchange for nonvoting stock, and it wil per-
mit the exchange of voting preferred for common stock. 16 9 There
are good arguments that neither exchange is consonant with the
statutory scheme. 170 Even if the general limits of the requirement
163. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). For a discussion of the possibilities of
tax avoidance, see notes 235-64 infra and accompanying text.
164. They are voting stock, stock, and securities. See I.R.C. §§ 368, 354, 356. There is
a fourth residual category, other property, but all gain is always taxed on the receipt of
such property, and so is of no interest here.
165. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 216, 48 Stat. 705.
166. See generally Dailey, supra note 1.
167. See, eg., S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1934).
168. See Dailey, supra note 1.
169. Id. at 737. See also Hellerstein, supra note 105, at 260-61, 272-76.
170. See generally Dailey, supra note 1.
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are known today, there remains some difficulty in applying the
requirement to contingent consideration.''
Using the theoretical analysis outlined above, 7z however, will
resolve most of these problems. First, all contingent consideration
that embodies only a series of time variant rights, each of which
would qualify as voting stock, ought itself to qualify as voting
stock. For example, voting, convertible preferred stock should
qualify. 173 Second, looking to the function of the voting stock re-
quirement, property interests that will either give rise to a voting
stock interest or lapse ought to qualify. Thus stock warrants, con-
tingent voting stock, and escrowed voting stock should qualify.174
Third, contractual options to acquire voting stock should not dis-
qualify a transaction. 75 Contractual rights to receive additional
dividends, even though imbedded in stock instruments, may well
be impermissible because they give rise to cash boot.' 76 Thus the
law for contingent consideration in B and C reorganizations can
be outlined very simply in light of the preceding theoretical analy-
sis.
But one final challenge remains. According to the reasoning
of Southwest Consolidated the term "voting stock" should be read
narrowly to exclude most of the interests described above. 177 That
position can be answered in either of two ways. The strongest ar-
171. For example, what measure of voting rights must be satisfied in the case of a
contingent interest in additional voting stock? Must escrowed stock allow the beneficial
owner to vote the stock during the period? If not, what duration may the escrow have?
These questions have not been addressed by the courts, the Service, or the commentators;
and the answers, judging from the law of what qualifies as voting stock generally, are not
apparent.
172. See Section II, supra.
173. See Rev. Rul. 73-205, 1973-1 C.B. 188.
174. It may be proper, however, to restrict the receipt of stock in exchange for the
tender of stock warrants as an uphill exchange. See notes 150-54 supra and accompanying
text.
175. This would reverse the current law. See Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp.,
315 U.S. 194 (1942); Treas. Reg. § 1.354-1(e) (1955).
176. Such receipt is, however, permissible under present law. See Rev. Rul. 75-33,
1975-1 C.B. 115. But cf. Rev. Rul. 66-112, 1966-1 C.B. 68 (Carlberg nonacquiescence
based, in part, on rights to dividends on contingent stock).
177. 315 U.S. at 200-01. Although the "plain meaning" style of statutory interpreta-
tion has been very seriously challenged as vacuous and incoherent, it still has its support-
ers. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1145 (tentative ed. 1958).
For a recent decision following that model, see William H. Bateman, 40 T.C. 408 (1963),
appeal dismissed (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1964). Of course, if the theoretical foundations of Jus-
tice Douglas' interpretation are rejected, that opinion itself, relying as it does on an appeal
to the "plain meaning" of the statute, will hardly be persuasive. Because that style of inter-
pretation remains vital, however, this article attempts to persuade even those who adopt
Justice Douglas' premises in Southwest Consolidated.
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gument is that from the functional model. There is no support in
the language or purpose of the statute that would warrant treating
reorganization exchanges made under uncertainty so differently
from certain reorganizations. The statutory nonrecognition lan-
guage and purpose are served by treating voting stock warrants
and related instruments as voting stock. If that premise is re-
jected, there can be no principled allowance of any form of con-
tingent consideration. 8 Second, the argument of Southwest
Consolidated may itself be challenged. Realization of income
should not be the event which triggers a determination of whether
nonrecognition is proper but rather the substantial completion of
the reorganization exchange. Once it is admitted that the Service
and the courts must look to the substance of these transactions,
there is no argument that they ought not look into the substance of
the contingent rights as well. Thus even the premise of Justice
Douglas' argument seems open to serious challenge. So there
seems no strong argument, save from the most dogmatic, formalist
position, against the use of these forms of contingent considera-
tion in reorganization.
2. Stock
The two-tier approach of section 354(a) is a recent addition to
the nonrecognition provisions for corporate reorganizations. 179
But the theory is not novel: it is simply another codification of the
continuity of interest principle. 180 Perhaps because the term
"stock" is often used elsewhere in the Code' 8' (as is the term
"stock or securities"), 8 2 the difficulties seem to have been less se-
vere than in the definition of "voting stock." There has been far
less reported litigation on the question of what qualifies as stock in
the reorganization context. In the field of contingent considera-
tion, the stakes are much the same as with voting stock,183 the
178. The reasoning of Carlberg and the revenue procedures that permit the use of con-
tingent and escrowed stock is, under this view, simply ad hoc in nature, designed to reach
the right result. Because those authorities are unable or unwilling to restrict Southwest
Consolidated to its facts, the practical and theoretical inconsistencies and ambiguities de-
scribed in Section I supra naturally arise. This position is buttressed by those provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code and the treasury regulations thereunder that provide that stock
options and warrants will be treated as stock. Eg., I.R.C. §§ 305, 306.
179. The change was made in the enactment of the 1954 Code.
180. See generally B. BITTKER & J. EusTic, supra note 8, at 14-16 to 26.
181. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 301-306.
182. Eg., I.R.C. §§ 181, 191, 311(d)(2)(D), 333(0(2).
183. The fundamental difference is that the presence of boot in a B or C reorganization
may force recognition of all gain, whereas boot in an otherwise qualifying transaction will
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analysis much the same, too. Thus contingent and escrowed
stock, convertible preferred, and stock warrants and options ought
all to qualify as stock for the purposes of nonrecognition in a reor-
ganization. To conclude so easily that there is little difference be-
tween the construction of the scope of the term "voting stock" and
the term "stock" may seem to ignore the different statutory con-
texts of the two terms.' But the difference in statutory context
only reinforces the expansive reading offered above with regard to
contingent consideration. The section 354 requirement that stock
alone be entitled to unqualified nonrecognition supports the inter-
pretation that any more senior interest be recognized insofar as
there is gain. This statutory provision reinforces the argument
above that convertible debt ought not to qualify for nonrecogni-
tion. On the other hand, such a provision might be construed to
require an allocation between the value of the convertible deben-
ture attributable to the debt interest and the value attributable to
the stock interest. 185 On this approach, only the former would be
ineligible for nonrecognition.
The argument against allocation-an argument unnecessary in
the context of a B reorganization and of limited importance for a
C reorganization for which additional boot will be sufficient to
disqualify the entire transaction' 86-- must be based on the poten-
tial for taxpayer abuse and the lack of business justification for
such a feature. The potential for illicit tax avoidance lies in the
ability of taxpayers to use sham convertible debt and to manipu-
late its value to defer gain in a reorganization.187 A taxpayer seek-
ing to defer his tax on a reorganization exchange in which he
obtained a large measure of debt might attempt to camouflage a
large part of the value of that debt by masquerading the instru-
ment as a convertible and attributing an improperly great portion
trigger recognition of gain only to the extent of the value of the nonqualifying property
received.
184. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
185. See, ag., Treas. Reg. § 1.356-1(c), Example I (recognition determined by valua-
tion of taxable assets received in § 356 transaction) (1955). See generally 3A J. MERTENS,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 21.32 (rev. ed. 1977).
186. I.R.C. § 368. It would be unnecessary because allocation is required only with
regard to the carryover basis and the nonrecognition of gain, neither of which are relevant
in a taxable acquisition in which all gain is recognized and a cost basis is assigned. I.R.C.
§ 358. For a C reorganization allocation may be necessary if nonqualifying consideration
is employed pursuant to I.R.C. § 368(a)(2).
187. The valuation of convertibles is a difficult and complex task. It is, moreover, a
project which achieves its results with little certainty. See M. TENNICAN, supra note 132, at
7-9.
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of the value to the potential equity interest. In such a world, all
debt in reorganization exchanges would be convertible, only some
would be convertible at more favorable terms than others. The
Service would have little remedy against such schemes.'88 Thus, a
prophylactic rule ought to be adopted and convertible debt treated
as debt, not stock. 189
This conclusion is supported by the recognition that the inclu-
sion in the convertible of a nonqualifying senior, debt instrument
serves no purpose in the allocation and reduction of risk and un-
certainty in the acquisition, the business reasons which may justify
contingent consideration. Whatever contingencies are antici-
pated, they may be dealt with effectively by means of convertible
preferred. 9 ' If in the future preferred stock should be disquali-
fied as voting stock in B and C reorganizations, then the parties
will no longer be able to increase the seniority of their interests in
B and C reorganizations. Contingent and escrowed stock would
still be permissible, as would stock warrants. If the at risk require-
ment were extended consistently to bar the exchange of voting
common for voting preferred (as an uphill exchange), there would
still remain multiple devices by which the uncertainty could be
allocated as contingent consideration. The disqualification of pre-
ferred stock in reorganizations which today permit only voting
stock would block the receipt of convertible preferred. Such a bar
ought not otherwise affect the use of contingent consideration.
Under the present statute, if the parties seek the seniority of debt,
they must be prepared to recognize gain in accordance with the
provisions of sections 354 and 356.
3. Securities
The second part of the 1954 enactment of the continuity of
interest requirement was a restriction of nonrecognition upon the
receipt of securities to the principal amount of securities ten-
188. Although an allocation of burden of proof might make the taxpayer's case more
difficult, the taxpayer would ordinarily be in a far more informed position than the Service
and be able to produce the evidence necessary to establish any reasonable valuation, how-
ever high.
189. Cf. Rev. Rul. 77-437, 1977-2 C.B. 28, 29 (convertible debt treated as debt until
conversion for purposes of determining gain on cancellation of indebtedness in a recapitali-
zation).
190. For an analysis of the financial role of convertibles, see M. TENNICAN, supra note
132, at 11-23. "Convertible preferred stocks are nearly identical to convertible debentures."
Id. at 22.
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dered.' 9 1 The treasury regulations provide that stock warrants
and options do not qualify as securities.' 92 Because stock war-
rants and options are ordinarily thought of as securities, at least
for the purposes of federal securities regulation, 193 it seems anom-
alous to stipulate by administrative fiat that they are not included
in the term "securities" for the purposes of sections 354 and 356.
One argument in support of such a conclusion, however, is that
the term "securities" does not include stock within its scope. 194
Therefore, why should the term include within its scope even
more junior interests like stock warrants? 95 We have urged above
that the term "stock" should include, for tax purposes, interests
like stock warrants and options as is provided in other contexts of
subchapter C. However, if the precedents are too difficult to over-
turn at the administrative level, such interests ought to qualify as
securities because such interests are ordinarily considered securi-
ties, at least in the overarching federal securities regulation con-
text, 196 and because such inclusion would not do violence to the
statutory scheme of requiring exchanging shareholders in a reor-
ganization to keep their investment at risk. Therefore, although
the emerging pattern seems initially anomalous, there is no per-
suasive argument against including stock warrants and options as
securities, if such interests are not qualified as stock. There are,
191. The legislative history, beyond demonstrating the obvious intent to restrict further
the availability of reorganization treatment, is strangely silent on the choice of language to
reach that result. In particular, there is no indication why the statute employs the standard
of principal amount rather than a standard of value. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 51 (1955), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4623, 4682.
192. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.354-1(e), .355-1(a) (1955). The formal argument against stock
warrant qualification has initial appeal, at least with respect to qualification as voting stock.
Ordinary usage does not usually include voting stock warrants within the rubric of voting
stock, nor does the law of corporations. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPO-
RATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 151-52, 180-85 (1933); A. DEWING, A STUDY OF CORPO-
RATION SECURmTIES 17-32 (1934). But those appeals both disappear with regard to
qualification of stock warrants as securities if they will not qualify as stock. The federal
securities law and ordinary usage usually classify stock warrants as securities. So the pre-
sumption here is on the other side, and it would seem that if stock warrants do not qualify
as stock (a fortiori as voting stock), they ought at least to qualify as securities. Thus there
seems very little support for the current treasury regulations to the contrary.
The only support for the regulations might come from the argument that since warrants
have been held not to qualify either as voting stock (Southwest Consolidated) or as stock
(Bateman and Gordon), they must fail to qualify as securities which are tacitly debt securi-
ties. D. HERwrrz, supra note 129, at 106.
193. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1976).
194. Although the statute does not explicitly so provide, only such an interpretation
reconciles the varying treatment of stock and securities.
195. See D. HERwrrz, supra note 129, at 106.
196. See note 193 supra.
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however, two theoretical problems regarding the characterization
of contingent consideration as a security. First, the terms of sec-
tion 354(a)(2) provide for the nonrecognition of gain on receipt of
securities only if the principal amount received is not more than
the principal amount of securities tendered. That provision does
not easily apply to stock warrants without principal amount. Sec-
ond, assuming a short-term note of insufficient duration to qualify
as a security, 19 7 would a provision for the conversion of such a
note into preferred stock at the option of the holder qualify the
note as a security?
The language of section 354(a)(2) would support an argument
that stock warrants cannot qualify as securities. 98 Assume that
stock warrants are securities, without face amount. If they are re-
ceived in an exchange in which no securities are tendered, then
section 354(a)(1) is inapplicable according to section 354(a)(2)(B),
and gain, in the amount of the fair market value of the warrants, is
recognized pursuant to section 356(a)(1). But on appeal to section
354(a)(2)(A) rather than section 354(a)(2)(B), section 354 is appli-
cable and because the principal amount of the securities received
($0) does not exceed the principal amount of the securities ten-
dered ($0), no gain is recognized. Thus, the reductio goes, ac-
cepting warrants as securities leads to an inconsistency in section
354. This argument has not been made by the Service or in the
courts; the support for the current treasury regulations is pre-
sumed to come by analogy to Southwest Consolidated.9 9 The ap-
parent paradox is hardly insoluble if the intent of the statute is
considered. The purpose was to bar uphill conversions without
recognition. That policy is not served by recognizing gain in the
amount of the fair market value of the warrants; it is served by
according those warrants nonrecognition. 00 Thus section
354(a)(2)(A) rather than section 354(a)(2)(B) should govern.
Turning to the second problem, it must be recognized that the
problem of defining the scope of the term "securities" has been
very real, at least since Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v.
197. Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
198. See William H. Bateman, 40 T.C. 408, 413-14 (1963), appeal dismissed, (4th Cir.
Jan. 28, 1964).
199. B. BITKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 8, at 14-75. Under the statute construed
there, however, this argument could not be made. The 1934 Revenue Act made no provi-
sion for the two-tier treatment of stock and securities introduced in the 1954 Code.
200. This conclusion follows from the policy of denying nonrecognition in an otherwise
qualifying exchange if the taxpayer achieves an uphill exchange in the reorganization. See
notes 142-48 supra and accompanying text. See also Dailey, supra note 1, at 778-79.
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Commissioner.20 1 Although the rule of that case, a requirement
that securities have a minimum duration, seems mistaken,20 2 that
rule has been firmly established in the current law of reorganiza-
tion.20 3 Thus it appears that a short-term note, that would not
itself qualify, raises peculiar problems when it carries a conversion
privilege into common stock. But the puzzle is largely a theoreti-
cal one; such instruments rarely occur.204 The argument from
analogy presented above would seem to have little weight because
the class of consideration at issue, "securities," is the most senior
interest, and there are interests senior to short-term notes which
will qualify as securities. 0 5 So if an argument against the short-
term note is to be made, it must be on the terms of the reorganiza-
tion doctrine which contrasts reorganization with sale in the re-
structuring of control of an enterprise. 6 As the court reasoned in
Pinellas, the shareholder who receives a short-term note, even if a
portion of that note represents its conversion feature, has received
in part a cash equivalent. 0 7 Since such receipt is taxable, even in
reorganization, the value of the short-term note independent of
the conversion privilege ought to be taxable. In addition, because
of the possible manipulation of convertibles by shareholders, the
entire value of the instrument should be taxable.20 8 Therefore, a
short-term note subject to a convertible feature ought not qualify
as a security.
20 9
201. 287 U.S. 462 (1933). For a trenchant criticism of this decision and its progeny, see
Griswold, "Securities" and "Continuity of Interest," 58 HARv. L. REv. 705 (1945).
202. The confusion, according to Griswold, supra note 201, arises from infusing the
definition of the term "security" with the requirement of a reorganization, continuity of
interest. The result is that a short-term note, more senior than stock but less senior than
long-term debentures, both of which qualify, is itself unqualified under Pinellas as well as
Neville Coke & Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1945).
203. See generally B. BrrIKER & J. EusTIcE, supra note 8, 14.31, at 14-75 to 76.
204. They rarely occur, presumably because even more than convertible debentures the
convertibility feature and the short-term note play different roles in finance, the one de-
ferred equity financing and the other short-term capital funding. Also, the two appeal to
investors with very different risk preferences. Thus it is not surprising that no case or
ruling request has been reported in which such an instrument has been employed, in-
dependent of the tax uncertainty its use would engender.
205. Griswold, supra note 201, at 725.
206. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955).
207. See generally Mylan, Cost Recovery as a Method of Reporting Gain from Disposi-
tions of Property, 8 WILLAMETrE LJ. 1 (1972); Comment, The Doctrine of Cash
Equivalency as Illustrated by Land Sales Contracts and Notes Received for Services
Rendered, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 219 (1972).
208. See notes 128-32 supra and accompanying text.
209. Of course, if with Griswold it is concluded that the continuity of interest require-
ment ought not to be construed to bar such short-term interests as securities, either on the
argument from analogy noted at note 196 supra, or on the argument that the period of
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4. Conclusions
The principal task here has been to show how the application
of the theoretical analysis outlined in the preceding section can
yield a clear and consistent doctrine governing contingent consid-
eration in reorganizations. The pattern that emerges differs
greatly from the present law. First, instruments like stock war-
rants and stock options, today denied nonrecognition even as se-
curities, a fortiori as stock, ought to be permissible consideration
in a reorganization. Second, the limitations placed upon contin-
gent and escrowed stock are unnecessary. Because these instru-
ments are deemed to qualify, the restrictions are unwarranted. By
legitimizing the use of such contingent consideration, it is also
possible to expand its scope.210 Third, however, the present bar
against classification of many forms of convertible senior securi-
ties as stock-or as voting stock is upheld, on the argument that
such instruments give their holder an impermissible straddle. Fi-
nally, although current law permits shareholders to receive special
dividends, this interest may well constitute a cash equivalent and
thus ought to trigger recognition of gain. The principle that
emerges from these rules is that the substantive rights of the par-
ties govern the tax consequences of the transactions; little turns on
the names of the instruments or whether the rights are embodied
in property or in contracts. Such a law will at once effect the legis-
lative policy and allow corporate planners to provide for uncer-
tainty in corporate acquisitions. The principal remaining problem
is how, given this potential increase in flexibility during reorgani-
zation, the carryover basis provisions operate.
B. The Treatment of Basis
For taxpayers the crucial feature of reorganization treatment is
nonrecognition of gain or loss. But together with the provision for
nonrecognition treatment, the Code provides for carryover bases
for the acquiring corporation 21' and the shareholders of the ac-
quired corporation (the corporation's basis is sometimes termed
nonrecognition for a short-term note is sufficiently short that the temporary deferral is not
improper, then a fortiori a convertible short-term note ought to qualify as a security. How-
ever insubstantial the rationale for the holding in Pinellas and the cases that follow, that
rule is well imbedded in the law of reorganizations.
210. For a discussion of the uncertainties in the present law, see notes 78-81 supra and
accompanying text.
211. I.R.C. §§ 358, 362.
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"substituted").212 The former takes the basis held by the exchang-
ing shareholders plus any gain realized by the transferor. Thus in
a stock swap the corporation takes as its basis in the stock it ac-
quires the basis therein of the exchanging shareholders. The
shareholders retain in the new shares their old basis. Because con-
tingent consideration is ordinarily paid by the acquiring corpora-
tion in return for a certain consideration from the exchanging
shareholders,213 there are rarely special basis problems for the cor-
poration. It simply acquires the shareholders' old basis. But inso-
far as the shareholder has received an uncertain consideration, he
may encounter either of two particular problems in the determina-
tion of his basis during the life of the contingent consideration.
The first problem is the simpler of the two. It may be styled a
problem of horizontal allocation. For example, assume that an ex-
changing shareholder exchanges in a B reorganization his stock
and receives in return for each share of stock tendered two shares
initially. Additionally, he receives a contingent right to receive
two additional shares of the acquiring corporation if in any one of
the following three years the performance of the acquired corpo-
ration reaches a certain level.214 Assume further that the right to
receive the additional shares is a right of the record holder as of
the reorganization. If such a shareholder sells the following year,
prior to the issuance of the additional stock and prior to the deter-
mination that such stock will be issued, what is his basis in the
stock sold? The taxpayer would like to allocate the full aliquot
share of the carryover basis to the shares sold; the Service would
like to allocate one-half of the initial basis.2" 5 There is little law
on this matter, although the Service position is clear.216
Prima facie, any one of five theories might be applied to define
212. Id.
213. In theory, of course, the contingent consideration could be paid by the sharehold-
ers. But since the acquiring corporation seeks immediate control of the acquired corpora-
tion in the acquisition, such contingent consideration must be in a form other than the
shares tendered in the stock swap or other reorganization proceeding. This alone raises
significant difficulties. Additionally, however, the transaction costs would be much in-
creased by requiring additional payments, of whatever form, from a multitude of parties.
Thus, in practice, the contingent consideration seems always to be paid by the acquiring
corporation.
214. Under this plan, the taxpayers would be entitled to an affirmative ruling on the
exchange under Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B.-568.
215. Id See also Tillinghast, supra note 1, at 476.
216. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. For advance rulings the maximum number of
contingent shares must be stated at the outset. If, however, the maximum number of shares
were not stated, it would seem permissible for the Service to assume a potentially infinite
number of shares and assign a zero basis to the shares initially received.
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the proper allocation. First, the exchange might be styled an open
transaction,1 7 in which there would be no gain realized until
there had been a total recovery of basis. The open transaction
theory might operate in either of two ways. First, the initial, fixed
consideration might be removed from the calculation because en-
titled to nonrecognition. The return of the basis, then, would ap-
ply only to the additional, contingent payout. Such a rule would,
except in those cases in which the contingent payouts exceed the
substituted basis, insulate the entire transaction from taxation.
Under the second open transaction approach, the entire amounts
received might be deemed to be a return of basis, and any contin-
gent payments received in excess of basis would be taxable. This
method would involve no special rules derived from the nonrecog-
nition provisions and is simply a direct application of the Burnet v.
Logan rule. 218 Third, it might be presumed that no basis was
properly allocated to the future shares prior to issuance, and so the
shareholder would be entitled to deduct his full carryover basis for
the aliquot share of any stock disposed of. Fourth, an attempt
might be made to allocate the value between the present shares
and the rights to receive additional shares and then allocate the
carryover basis in proportion to value. Fifth, it might be pre-
sumed that all stock which, could be issued would be issued and
the shareholder entitled to allocate only a fraction of his propor-
tional basis with the denominator based on the number of shares
potentially received. This is the current Internal Revenue Service
position.21 9
Given the multiplicity of theories available, it is not initially
apparent which ought to govern. In a case in which the uncer-
tainty was so great that the open transaction doctrine should ap-
ply,220 it would seem that the rule of basis recovery stated in
Burnet v. Logan22 ought to apply. But in the far greater number
of cases there can be no initial recovery of basis.222 The general
rule under the Code provides for the allocation of basis among
217. See Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
218. Id.
219. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
220. See B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 8, 114.56, at 14-142; M. CHIRELSTEIN,
supra note 96, at 242.
221. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
222. In particular, this result is proper in those cases in which there is not sufficient
uncertainty to hold that the assets have no fair market value. Cf., e.g., Morrison v. Com-
missioner, 59 T.C. 248, 259-61 (1972) (valuation of warrants for tax purposes).
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assets;223 it would require an allocation between the actual consid-
eration initially received and the contingent consideration. The
danger in such a rule is that the taxpayer who had realized gain
and knew which interest he would liquidate first could assign to it
a higher basis and achieve an unjustified tax deferral.224 The
compromise approach, which assumes that one-half of all contin-
gent shares are issued and apportions the basis ratably among the
property received, may seem a safer approach from the Treasury
perspective. There are, however, two principal drawbacks. First,
there would always have to be subsequent basis adjustments when
the actual number of shares exchanged became known. Second,
such a rule would give the taxpayer a non-zero basis only when
the contingent consideration had an upper limit. Although such a
limit is imposed today,2 1 there is little support for such a rule. It
appears that the general rule should govern here; the possibility of
manipulation seems little greater than in other areas of the law.
Far more complicated problems of basis determination arise
with the introduction of more complex forms of contingent con-
sideration. These can be styled problems of vertical allocation.
For example, assume that instead of receiving either of the contin-
gent stock deals described above, the exchanging shareholder
would receive in the B reorganization for each share tendered one
share of common stock and one common stock warrant entitling
him to purchase an additional share at the current market price.
There would seem to be no option but to require an allocation of
value to the two elements of consideration received and to assign a
basis to each in proportion to its value.226 To assign to either ele-
223. See 3A J. MERTENS, supra note 185, at § 21.32.
224. Insofar as these would be nondepreciable assets, what basis the taxpayer assigns to
the various assets might not have to be determined until a disposition, in which case a
higher basis could be applied to that asset which is disposed of first. Compare I.R.C.
§§ 167, 1016 with I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1002.
225. See Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568, 569.
226. Support for such a strategy can be found in the current treatment of the issue price
of bond warrant units in computing the original issue discount. According to Treas. Reg.
§ 1.163-4(a), the issue price of a bond warrant package may be allocated between the bond
and the warrant according to their respective values. T.D. 7213, 1972-2 C.B. 482. If the
treatment of the original issue discount can be founded on such an allocation of value, it
would not seem improper also to require such allocation to determine carryover basis in
reorganizations.
By contrast, however, the treasury regulations prohibit the allocation of a portion of the
issue price of a convertible debenture to the conversion feature. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-4(a),
T.D. 7213, 1972-2 C.B. 482. That rule against allocation has been upheld in the courts.
AMF, Inc. v. United States, 476 F.2d 1351 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Hunt Foods, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 57 T.C. 633 (1972), ajrd per curiam, 496 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1974); Chock Full
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ment a greater than proportional basis might allow the taxpayer to
defer gain, or alternatively, impose an inequitable burden on his
liquidation of less than all classes of consideration received in the
exchange. Even if a proportional basis were carried over, there
would be obvious possibilities of taxpayer manipulation. 7  A
final difficulty arises if warrants are never exercised and instead
lapse. Does the taxpayer then properly report a loss? Such a re-
sult would be inconsistent with the analysis that the warrants were
received as an integral element in an ongoing reorganization ex-
change.228 The proper treatment instead would seem to be to allo-
cate the basis previously assigned to the stock warrants to the
other consideration received. But even such a bald rule would en-
counter difficulty if, in the interim, the shareholder had sold his
shares. In such a case, either the taxpayer would be burdened
with a disappearing basis229 or he must be allowed to recognize his
loss. The latter result is probably preferred.230
O'Nuts Corp. v. United States, 453 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1971). No attempt will be made here
to evaluate the distinction between the two problems that the court attempts to draw. For
our purposes, it is sufficient to note that there is little support for extending the rationale of
Chock Full OWuts to the reorganization provisions. Absent such an affirmative rationale,
there is no reason to treat bond warrant units and convertible bonds, functionally so simi-
lar, so differently in the tax law. But see 453 F.2d at 305.
227. See note 224 supra and accompanying text.
228. At present, a taxpayer who disposes of an interest acquired in a reorganization
exchange recognizes gain or loss thereon. I.R.C. §§ 1002, 1012. There is no applicable
nonrecognition provision. To the extent, however, contingent consideration is permitted in
reorganizations, then allowing taxpayers to recognize loss on the lapse of warrants or con-
version rights will permit them to defer taxation. At a more theoretical level, permitting
contingent consideration requires that exchange relationships must be taxed differently
from exchange transactions, and that for such relationships recognition of loss must await
the substantial disposition of the consideration. In short, once the tax treatment of an
exchange relationship is determined on a holistic approach, fragmentation cannot be rein-
troduced. A similar approach has been taken in § 356, which allows only gain to be recog-
nized on the receipt of both nonrecognition property and boot, in an attempt to restrict the
possibility of manipulation. But see Rev. Rul. 78-376, 1978-42 I.R.B. 51 (gain recognized
on return of escrowed stock received in a reorganization).
At a practical level, a continued nonrecognition rule may be defended on the argument
that it is the sole rule sufficient to prevent illicit tax avoidance.
229. The disappearing basis is a burden, ceterlsparibus, because it entails that a tax-
payer will have been taxed on gain which was in fact only recovery of basis or that he will
have been denied a loss.
230. This case seems clearly distinguishable from the ordinary case in which the war-
rants lapse prior to a disposition of the taxpayer's other interest because the taxpayer has
liquidated his entire position in the enterprise. A similar situation can arise with regard to
§ 306 stock when preferred stock is distributed on common stock. On the total disposition
of the common, the question arises as to how to treat the gain on the sale of the § 306 stock.
It is generally provided that in such a case the taint has disappeared. To the extent that the
dividend stock is allocated a basis and then taxed as ordinary income on the proceeds of a
disposition, that basis can be reallocated to the common. See generaly B. BITrr & J.
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Perhaps the best treatment for these basis problems is simply
to require the allocation of basis among the assets received, con-
tingent as well as certain, in keeping with the general allocation
rules.3 But the additional limitation ought to be imposed, as de-
tailed above, that loss would be recognized on the liquidation
(nonreceipt) of the contingent consideration only if the entire in-
vestment in the certain consideration had previously been liqui-
dated.232 In the event that the certain consideration had not been
liquidated, the proportion of the basis initially allocated to the
contingent consideration ought to be reallocated to the certain
consideration. These rules will obviously not provide a fair solu-
tion in all cases, and there may be some opportunity for misallo-
cation by taxpayers of the value in an attempt to gain an improper
tax advantage.3 3 But the potential for harm does not seem egre-
gious because the rule proposed compromises the claims of the
Service to presume the payment of the contingent consideration in
full and the preference of the taxpayer to allocate a basis to the
contingent consideration only when realized.234
IV. TAX AVOIDANCE WITH CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION
The preceding exploration of the problems of nonrecognition
and basis carryovers for contingent consideration in reorganiza-
tions may have seemed shortsighted. Whatever may be the rheto-
EUSTICE, supra note 8, at ch. 10. That distinction makes a difference because in the case of
a total liquidation the lapse of the warrants to which the taxpayer had assigned a basis
appears more nearly like an event of realization. By contrast, when warrants lapse while a
taxpayer's stock interest continues, only a mere change in the form of the taxpayer's inter-
est has occurred.
231. See J. MERTENS, supra note 185. Cf. note 226, supra (original issue discount
determined on allocation of issue price to warrant in bond warrant unit, but not to conver-
sion element in convertible bonds).
232. Compare the treatment of § 306 stock described in note 230 supra.
233. For example, a taxpayer anticipating sale of the noncontingent stock at a loss soon
after the reorganization and in a year when other independent losses are to be taken may
wish to preserve in full a portion of that loss for a future year when gains are anticipated
rather than be subject to the loss carryover rules of I.R.C. § 1212(b). By use of contingent
rights sure to lapse in the desired year (after all the noncontingent rights have been sold), a
portion of the loss may be postponed in full to that year in the amount of the basis assigned
to the sure-to-lapse contingent interest. It would be difficult indeed to police such an at-
tempt. To the extent that a reorganization promises to operate as such a manipulative
device, it is clearly within the Commissioner's discretion to refuse to rule affirmatively
under § 7805, which would likely inhibit such transactions. Of course, such a transaction
could also be challenged after the fact as a sham.
234. This scheme is consistent with the general Code provisions for the allocation of
basis, cost, or carryover. See generally 3A J. MERTENS, supra note 185, § 21.32.
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ric of the law here,235 the reality is that the Service and the courts
are today principally concerned with the potential of such consid-
eration for illicit tax avoidance. 2 6 The two forms such avoidance
may take are the conversion of personal compensation into capital
gains accorded nonrecognition in a reorganization and the bailout
of earnings and profits from a corporation as contingent consider-
ation taxed only as deferred capital gains.2 37 An easing of the re-
straints on the use of contingent consideration in reorganizations
may make such tax evasion easier. Accordingly, given the appar-
ent importance ascribed to the potential abuses, those abuses and
their impact on the reforms here proposed will be examined.
The reorganization provisions, like section 337, are intended to
shelter only certain kinds of gain on a qualifying exchange.2 3 But
articulating the limits of the countervailing judicial doctrines and
Code provisions 239 with respect to the reorganization provisions is
not easy. The first stage is to gauge the policies that according
nonrecognition to all gains in reorganizations would allegedly of-
fend. The first policy is that of taxing personal service compensa-
tion as ordinary income on its receipt. A variety of Code
provisions seek to assure this result: principally relevant are sec-
tion 61 defining gross income, section 83 providing for the taxa-
tion as ordinary income of property received in exchange for
services, and sections 421 through 424 on taxation of employee
stock options.2' ° The common thread of these provisions is that
235. The rhetoric, as is demonstrated in Section I supra, is one of the formal interpreta-
tions of the statutory language.
236. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 8, 14.56, at 14-143 to 144.
237. Although there are some other problems, e.g., the receipt of boot in the form of
contingent consideration and the attempt to masquerade speculative transactions as reorga-
nizations, the former has been adequately explored above, and the latter seems a very
limited problem, if contrary to the language and purpose of the statute at all.
238. This is especially clear in the case of the reorganization provisions that provide for
nonrecognition only on the gain and loss realized on the exchange of property. Even the
broader nonrecognition provisions of §§ 336 and 337 have been persuasively shown to be
limited by the tax benefit rule. O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition oaIncome and the Over-
riding Princoile ofthe Tax Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 27
TAX L. REv. 215 (1973). But litigation continues. See Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440 (1975), aft'd, 582 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1978)(resolution of conflict
between tax benefit rule and I.R.C. § 336).
239. E.g., I.R.C. § 1002; see Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b) (1960).
240. Such a policy is, of course, inherent in the overall income tax scheme, but it is
especially strong with regard to personal service income since such income constitutes by
far the greater portion of income for most taxpayers. In order to maintain the integrity and
equity of the present system, such as it is, tax avoidance in this regard must be severely
circumscribed.
The § 83 restricted stock provisions, for example, were enacted because taxpayers were
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compensation for personal services, notwithstanding its form as
stock or other property, is to be taxed as ordinary income when
realized. This policy is sufficiently important that certain provi-
sions, among them those of section 83, impose prophylactic rules
to block potential avoidance. 4' Although those rules may impose
hardship in particular cases, they have been upheld in the
courts.2 4 2
If a taxpayer succeeded in converting compensation income
into deferred capital gains in the course of the reorganization, it
would appear that the statutory policy requiring realization and
recognition on receipt as ordinary income would be thwarted. For
example, if corporation Y seeks to acquire closely held corpora-
tion X, in which all the stock is held by the current management,
and the purpose of the acquisition is to secure a supply of the X
products for use in the Y enterprise, it might be attractive to both
parties to continue the current management of X under long-term
management contracts. If there is uncertainty about the valuation
of X corporation, provision might be made for the issuance of
contingent rights to additional Y shares should X performance
reach specified levels. In this case it might be in the interests of
both parties to provide for more contingent shares than required
by the valuation uncertainties coupled with a lower salary for the
management. If such additional shares were deemed received in
the reorganization, they would not be initially taxed and would
ultimately be taxed only at capital gains rates, a very substantial
saving for the management. All that Y would lose would be the
deduction for the difference in salaries for its subsidiary, X. If this
deal were so structured that nonrecognition were obtained on the
additional shares paid, in fact, as personal service compensation,
the statutory policy would seem to have been thwarted.
One reply to the challenge that contingent consideration will
provide taxpayers with another means of tax avoidance would as-
sert that, insofar as nonrecognition is granted and the corporation
must forfeit the deduction for compensation,2 4 3 the possibility of
avoiding the taxation on receipt, as ordinary income, of personal service compensation.
See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2027, 2150-52.
241. Thus I.R.C. § 83 takes no account of the diminution of value by virtue of the
restrictions on negotiability. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1). This will result in an overstatement of the
income received.
242. Sakol v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 986 (1977), a'd, 574 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1978).
243. I am indebted to Professor William D. Andrews for calling this argument to my
attention.
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disguising compensation income as contingent consideration in a
reorganization exchange will neither be so attractive to the parties
nor as dangerous to the fisc as is presumed above. 2' The parties
will have bought the lower personal tax with a higher corporate
tax. While there is merit in this criticism, to pretend that the tax
avoidance challenge is so easily disarmed is to miss the duty of
fidelity to law. Under present law a corporation is not permitted
to buy such a tax benefit for its management. This is the lesson of
section 83 of the Code and the new stock options rules. 245
Whatever the sources of the current law, 46 and whatever its mer-
its, a taxpayer cannot achieve tax benefits consistent with the stat-
244. An example may help demonstrate why the loss of the corporate compensation
deduction will diminish the attractiveness of disguising compensation as contingent consid-
eration. Assume a corporation X, with income substantially above the $100,000 surtax
exemption, and a corporate officer subject to a 50% maximum personal service tax rate and
a 60% tax rate on investment income (thus a 24% capital gains tax rate). If the officer
receives $100,000 straight salary, the corporation will receive a deduction worth $46,000
and the individual will pay $50,000 in taxes. If, however, the corporation pays him $75,000
in salary with the remainder of the compensation paid as disguised contingent considera-
tion in a reorganization, the corporation will obtain only $34,500 in deductions. The indi-
vidual will pay $37,500 in taxes and realize (but not recognize) a capital gain of $25,000, on
which he must ultimately pay $6,000 in taxes. Ignoring the discount factor (the advantage
of deferral), such a strategy would leave the corporation and its officer $9,000 poorer than
paying direct compensation. The deferral effect will, of course, operate to reduce this loss.
But because a high bracket taxpayer is in virtually the same bracket as a large corporation,
the loss of the corporate deduction will largely (if not entirely) offset the gain of converting
ordinary income into capital gain.
245. That lesson follows from the response of Congress to foreclose such attempts to
allocate tax benefits in this context. I.R.C. § 422 (originally enacted as Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 603, 90 Stat. 1520); H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 171-73, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2897, 3065-66. In general,
of course, there is often no objection to the allocation of tax benefits.
246. There are two principal rationales for such a rule. First, it may be thought that
allowing the corporation to purchase such a tax benefit for its management may enable that
management to obtain excessive compensation because most shareholders, when they ex-
amine the compensation paid to executives, will be unaware of the different tax costs to the
corporation of the different forms of compensation. Corporation law, however, lacks any
very meaningful restrictions on executive compensation. See, e.g., ALI-ABA MODEL Bus.
CORP. AcT §§ 4(k), 4(o), 20 (1953). Manipulation of the tax law to the same end seems at
best a remote approach. See also W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
565 (4th ed. 1969) (fairness standards for directors dealing with their corporations).
The second argument for such a general rule of taxation on realization is one of fair-
ness. Individuals, receiving the same type of income in the same amount, should be taxed
at approximately the same rates. Of course, if the taxpayer has purchased the tax benefit
from the corporation, it is to be presumed that the purchase was made with a portion of the
otherwise taxable income he would have received in lieu of the nontaxable compensation.
In such a case, the taxpayer would be entitled to the tax benefit. The only objection to such
a conclusion would be that the purchase was made from an unequal bargaining partner, on
the argument above, and therefore such transactions should be discouraged by denying
taxpayers the tax benefit they seek. Cf. I.R.C. § 72 (treatment of annuities).
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utory policy by receiving compensation taxed at capital gains
rates.
After articulating the policy of realization-as-ordinary-income
as a "no tax benefit" policy, the next step is to determine how it
applies in the context of reorganization. No countervailing policy
in reorganizations allows compensation income to be taxed at cap-
ital gains rates.247 Such a principle, if it existed, might indeed
override a policy requiring realization of compensation income on
receipt.24 But the principle of nonrecognition exchanges is lim-
ited to gain or loss realized on the exchange of property; the com-
pensation income in question clearly fails to fall within the ambit
of the nonrecognition provisions.249 Support for such an interpre-
tation of the law is found in the short shrift given the taxpayer's
argument for nonrecognition of such compensation in LeVant v.
Commissioner.25 0 In that case, the taxpayer had been employed
by an unincorporated business, with the provision that after eight
months the taxpayer would be given an option to acquire twenty
percent of the theretofore sole proprietorship. Subsequently the
proprietorship was incorporated without any specific provision
having been made for the issuance of additional shares if LeVant,
the taxpayer, elected to exercise his option. Thereafter, the corpo-
ration was acquired in a reorganization by Colgate-Palmolive.
The taxpayer argued that the shares he received in that transac-
tion constituted payment for shares of Edison, Inc., his employer.
The reviewing court dismissed that argument, noting that "peti-
tioner's conveyance to Colgate of the claim he had against Edison,
however it be characterized, was not in substance or otherwise an
exchange of Edison shares for those of Colgate."25' Thus, to the
extent that a taxpayer can disguise compensation income as con-
tingent consideration in a reorganization he will have reaped an
improper tax advantage.
A prophylactic rule against contingent consideration in reorga-
247. The language of the provision applies, in principle and on its face, only to gain
realized on the exchange.
248. For example, if the ability of taxpayers to shift the form in which they held their
continued investment were at stake. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1960): "The underlying
assumption of these exceptions [to the general rule of recognition] is that the new property
is substantially a continuation of the old investment still unliquidated ....
249. Compare I.R.C. § 83(a) with §§ 354(a), 368(a).
250. 376 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1967). See also Morrison v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 248
(1972) (stock options received by management in merger held compensation under I.R.C.
§ 61(a)).
251. 376 F.2d at 441.
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nizations would prevent disguised compensation. A limitation on
the types of contingent consideration qualifying in reorganizations
and the limits on contingent consideration, such as exist under
present law, might yield similar benefits.252 Thus there is an argu-
ment for strict limitations. Before deeming such an argument dis-
positive, it is necessary to consider: first, whether in the face of
such a policy taxpayers could otherwise obtain the improper tax
advantage of converting ordinary compensation income into de-
ferred capital gains and, second, whether more limited regulation
might not sharply reduce the potential for abuse as well. Even if
contingent consideration were barred in reorganization, taxpayers
could still disguise future compensation as unrecognized gain on
the exchange. For example, in the stock acquisition described
above of a closely held corporation with continuing management,
additional shares might be paid to the management in lieu of a
portion of their future service compensation, with provision for
forfeiture or liquidated damages should the manager leave the
employment of the acquired corporation. If such a transaction re-
ceived the tax treatment sought by the parties, the shares received
in the exchange would constitute disguised personal service in-
come and would obtain both deferral and capital gains treat-
ment.253  Perhaps barring the use of contingent consideration
might make such schemes more transparent. Yet on the facts de-
252. For business reasons there will be limits to the duration of disguised compensation
agreements; the present Service restriction on contingent stock payouts, five years, roughly
coincides with this practical constraint. Consequently, that limit on duration is probably of
little effect in controlling this problem. Even if management desired a capital gains conver-
sion, it would be difficult to extend employment contracts longer than five years.
253. Although at one time such damages might have been difficult to enforce, liqui-
dated damages are today far more easily obtained, when reasonable. The potential long-
term relationship and the availability of the funds to pay the damages would both contrib-
ute to the likelihood of a court enforcing such a provision. So it would seem that such a
provision might be an alternative to drafting the attempt to manipulate the tax benefit
through contingent consideration. See A. CORBIN, CorRAcrs §§ 1054-1070 (2d ed.
1964); J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS § 234 (1974). Indeed, virtually any manipulation through
ordinary contingent consideration forms could just as easily be obtained through the use of
a certain consideration in the reorganization and a contractual provision for liquidated
damages under the employment contract. I.R.C. § 83(d). A badly drafted provision for
liquidated damages might constitute a substantial risk of forfeiture under I.R.C. § 83, sub-
jecting the taxpayer to taxation on the appreciation of the stock until the restriction lapses.
But a well drafted provision would appear as a liquidated damage provision of an execu-
tive employment contract, and would not trigger the application of§§ 83(a) and 83(c)(1). It
is unclear whether such an arrangement would fall within the scope of Rev. Proc. 77-37,
1977-2 C.B. 568, 570. If such an arrangement were deemed a condition imposed pursuant
to a plan of reorganization, the ruling guideline would apply. On the other hand, the
Service does recognize that employment agreements may be ancillary to, rather than incor-
porated in, reorganization plans. Eg., Rev. Rul. 77-271, 1977-2 C.B. 116, 117 and authori-
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scribed above, the Service would have to inquire rather deeply
into the economic realities of the entire deal to discover that the
damages upon termination constituted one element in a plan to
convert future ordinary income into unrecognized capital gain.2 54
The possibility of abuse can be policed, however, by less drastic
restrictions on contingent consideration.
The potential for abuse of contingent consideration exists only
in a small class of corporate acquisitions, those in which the ex-
changing shareholders will continue to receive substantial ordi-
nary income from the acquired or acquiring corporation.
Excluded are those cases in which the shareholders are not the
managers of the acquired corporation and those cases in which the
acquisition marks the termination of employment for the previous
management. 55 The Service might shape the remedy by looking
more carefully at the scope of the problem, rather than proposing
general restrictions. Looking then at the acquisition of closely
held corporations with provision for continuing management, the
Service might first require a description of the business purpose of
the contingent consideration. If the source of the uncertainty were
pending major litigation, for example, this burden would be easily
met. If, however, the source of the uncertainty were simply a bar-
gaining impasse, perhaps the Service should remain suspicious.
Second, the Service might consider the relationship between pre-
vious compensation and compensation after the acquisition. A
decline in compensation or a failure to increase compensation in
the light of increased responsibilities might each signal an illicit
attempt to avoid taxes. Third, the Service might look to the meas-
ure of compensation received by shareholders and the measure of
contingent consideration received; if these seem too nearly pro-
portional, there is again cause for concern. The above factors, of
course, do not delineate precisely how the Service ought to treat
this problem. But the possibility of improper tax avoidance is
ties cited therein. If the latter analysis were applied, such an arrangement would not be
policed by Rev. Proc. 77-37.
254. Perhaps the only force that such an objection has is that attempts to manipulate
tax advantages are more readily perceived for what they are in the context of an employ-
ment contract, less likely to be so perceived in the context of an apparent property ex-
change. This objection is easily answered in the following paragraph by the rules proposed
for the policing of contingent consideration employed to obtain deferred capital gains
treatment.
255. These cases will not be included because in the first class of cases there will be no
compensation for personal services paid to the exchanging shareholders, and in the second
class there will be no future compensation for which capital gains treatment could be
sought. See Morrison v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 248 (1972).
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very slight in a transaction in which there is a clear business pur-
pose for the amount of contingent consideration employed, there
is no reduction in executive compensation nor increase in respon-
sibilities, and contingent consideration is not proportional to com-
pensation. However these tests are applied, by shifting the burden
of proof or as conclusive presumptions, the Service can defeat pos-
sible attempts to employ contingent consideration to disguise ordi-
nary income received for personal services.
The second possible tax avoidance strategy for contingent con-
sideration is to distribute the earnings and profits of the corpora-
tion as capital gains rather than as dividends taxable as ordinary
income.256 The instant bailout traditionally takes the following
form. The shareholders of a corporation receive a nontaxable
stock dividend. They sell the stock so received to third parties,
recognizing only capital gains on the sale, and the corporation
then redeems the stock from the new shareholders, who also rec-
ognize only capital gain.257
This pattern seems closely paralleled by the two following uses
of contingent stock or stock warrants.
Case 1. Warrants (or contingent stock) are issued to share-
holders of an acquired corporation in a merger. The share-
holders subsequently sell the warrants (or contingent stock) to
third parties, from whom the warrants are redeemed prior to
exercise (or the contingent rights are repurchased prior to real-
ization).
Case 2. Warrants (or contingent stock) are issued to the
shareholders of an acquired corporation in a merger. The
warrants (or contingent stock rights) are subsequently sold to
third parties. The warrants are never exercised (or the contin-
gent stock is never issued).
In both cases, the shareholders will recognize only capital gain
through the sale to third parties, and the initial shareholders will
suffer no dilution in either control or profit participation. For-
mally, then, these uses of contingent consideration would seem to
constitute analogous types of bailout. Having posed the issue, we
must further explore first what forms of contingent consideration
pose this potential problem. Second, how serious is the problem if
256. The many varieties of bailouts have been catalogued by Professor Robert C. Clark
in his analysis of the structure of subchapter C. Clark, The Morphogenesis ofSubchapter C,
87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977).
257. See B. BITrKER & J. EusTICE, supra note 8, 11 10.01-.07; Chamberlin v. Commis-
sioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954).
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it is not dealt with under existing statutes? Finally, we examine
whether section 306 and related sections already provide a solu-
tion to this problem.
The bailout problem is raised only by independent, severable
forms of contingent consideration. That is, if the contingent rights
cannot be negotiated to a third party independently of the under-
lying equity participation with respect to which they were distrib-
uted, then the shareholder cannot dispose of his contingent
consideration without also disposing of his equity. For example,
if the contingent consideration takes the form of convertible pre-
ferred stock, no bailout can occur in this form. Nor can the prob-
lem arise if the contingent consideration is in the form of warrants
attached to convertible stock and exercisable only on conversion.
But in the case of stock warrants, contingent stock, or escrowed
stock, this possibility of a sale to a third party without affecting the
underlying equity is real.
Two principal arguments weigh against the use of such instru-
ments in a bailout. First, the investors who buy the contingent
consideration will be buying a very risky asset. Accordingly,
outside investors will properly be very hesitant to give full value
for the warrants.258 Second, the risk of dilution of control is pres-
ent, together with the potential dilution of equity. The sharehold-
ers who employ such consideration in a bailout will have taken a
far greater gamble than those who employ low-risk preferred
stock. These two drawbacks ought to be sufficient to limit the use
of contingent consideration in bailouts. 2 9 Accordingly, as a rule,
any contingent consideration not qualifying as section 306 stock260
ought not to be treated as effecting a bailout.
The final question is whether such bailouts are curtailed by
existing statutory or judicial doctrine. The only Code provision
directly relevant is section 306. But section 306 does not, on its
face, reach the many forms of contingent consideration which are
not section 306 stock, that is, stock other than common stock re-
258. Economically, the explanation is simply that the outside investors will confront an
asymetrically greater risk than do the issuing, controlling shareholders. Cf. M. TENNICAN,
supra note 132, at 14-15 (warrant lacks "downside" protection of convertible).
259. If a taxpayer were to couple the distribution of contingent consideration with a
disposition and redemption by the corporation, then an abuse might be present. The tax-
payers in control of the corporation could insure the redemption and thus protect against
even the slightest risk of dilution of control or participation in the future. But if such a
plan were adopted, the Service could easily penetrate its form to tax the shareholders on a
constructive dividend.
260. .LRC. § 306(c).
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ceived in a tax-free distribution to the shareholder. Some of the
contingent consideration interests which pose the problem of im-
proper tax avoidance would qualify as stock, e.g., escrowed and
contingent stock. If "stock" is given a broad scope, perhaps on the
argument that section 306 is a remedial provision, then stock war-
rants, as well as convertible, contingent, and escrowed stock,
would also qualify. So perhaps the problem, such as it is, is al-
ready adequately solved by the current law.
The concern with potential abuse of contingent consideration
has received little explicit attention. It is perhaps because the po-
tential abuses have been subjected to so little direct scrutiny that
they have played such an important role in the formulation of pol-
icy. Had these two arguments been given a full examination, their
force would today be greatly diminished. The first, the concern
that taxpayers may employ contingent consideration to defer taxa-
tion on compensation income and ultimately pay only at capital
gains rates, is genuine. But the threat seems no more serious than
the other ways in which taxpayers may seek this result and is a
problem by no means limited to reorganizations. It is both ineffi-
cient and ineffective to attempt to realize such a policy by restrict-
ing the use of contingent consideration in reorganization.26'
Moreover, such a restriction will violate the clear statutory policy
in favor of nonrecognition of gain on such exchanges.262 The ar-
gument that contingent consideration will be employed to bailout
earnings is even less persuasive. In the main, contingent consider-
ation cannot be used for such purpose. 263 To the extent that it can
be so employed, its use is probably reached under the current stat-
utes.2 64 While the possibility of tax avoidance with contingent
consideration must be addressed if such consideration is permitted
261. It is inefficient to attempt to realize such a policy by directly restricting contingent
consideration because such a policy will cut against the realization of the countervailing
policy of permitting the shuffling of investments in reorganizations. The strategy is ineffi-
cient because, as indicated, the tax abuses can be achieved without recourse to contingent
consideration.
262. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1960).
263. See B. BIT'KER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 8, 114.31, at 14-77; note 258 supra and
accompanying text. The unsuitability of contingent consideration for this purpose is rooted
in the very contingency of the interest. Bailouts employ more certain interests which can
easily be negotiated without loss of control. The speculative nature of contingent consider-
ation and the frequency with which such interests carry a potential control element both
count very heavily against the use of such interests in a bailout much as they count against
the use of contingent consideration as an interest payment. But see note 13 supra.
264. I.RIC. § 306.
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in reorganization, that possibility can hardly support any ban
against such use.
V. THE PossImLiTY OF REFORM
This article has focused upon the failure of the present law to
cope adequately with the problems of tax-free corporate acquisi-
tions under uncertainty. Its purpose has been to expose the fragil-
ity of the status quo as well as to propose the administrative and
legislative solutions that might allow the current reorganization
provisions to better solve these complex problems.
A. The Status Quo
The current law is founded, in large part, on two very weak
foundations. The first is that of Justice Douglas' opinion in South-
west Consolidated.265 As has been argued in preceding sections,
the argument that warrants cannot be employed in B and C reor-
ganizations is virtually without merit, as is the extension of that
doctrine by the courts and by the Service. The rule ought to have
been that voting stock warrants are permissible in reorganizations
when justified by a business purpose. The second dubious foun-
dation for the current treatment of contingent consideration is
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Carlberg.266 The distinctions
drawn between contingent stock and stock warrants, while per-
haps well intentioned, are insubstantial. Thus current contingent
consideration, employed in reliance on Justice Blackmun's opin-
ion, rests on an unsound foundation. Finally, the use of converti-
ble preferred stock, increasingly common, is itself on weak
ground. Although technically in compliance with the statute
which mandates only voting stock, the use of preferred stock is at
least arguably inconsistent with the at risk requirement of reor-
ganization status.2 67 Although the voting stock requirement has
survived without significant amendment, and perhaps will con-
tinue so to survive, there is strong reason to believe that the use of
preferred stock is inconsistent with the statutory scheme. Thus the
use of convertible preferred stock as the paramount form of con-
tingent consideration, as doctrinally fragile as that use is, is partic-
ularly troubling when a reconsideration of the purposes of the
265. 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
266. 281 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960). This article argues that Carlberg reaches the right
result, but that its path is open to criticism. See notes 46-71 supra and accompanying text.
267. 'See Dailey, supra note 1, at 778.
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statutory provisions and a critical scrutiny of the precedents sup-
ports a much broader use of other forms of contingent considera-
tion.268
B. Legislative Solutions
These problems admit of simple legislative solutions. Con-
gress could overturn the result in Southwest Consolidated269 by
means of a simple amendment to section 368. A new subsection,
368(d), should be added, to read:
STOCK WARRANTS AND CONTINGENT AND ESCROWED
STOCK-For the purposes of this part voting stock warrants
and escrowed and contingent voting stock will qualify as voting
stock. For the purposes of this part stock warrants and es-
crowed and contingent stock will qualify as stock.
Enactment of such an anti-Southwest Consolidated provision
would immediately overturn all the limitations imposed by that
opinion, and the doctrines erected in the wake of Carlberg by the
Service.27° Such an amendment would put contingent considera-
tion in tax-free corporate acquisitions on a firm foundation.
No explicit statutory provision is necessary to provide for allo-
cation of basis between certain and contingent consideration, as
that is the general rule.
C. Administrative Solutions
The same result can, in the main, be obtained by administra-
tive action. The principal source of operative law regarding con-
tingent consideration comes not from the bare holding in
Southwest Consolidated but from the administrative interpretation
of that decision, the revenue procedures governing contingent and
escrowed stock, and the regulations disqualifying stock warrants
268. Realist critics of the reorganization provisions may, however, view the analysis of
contingent consideration in reorganizations as a reduclio adabsurdum for those provisions.
C. Hellerstein, supra note 105 (realist critique of reorganization provisions). Thus, to the
extent that the reorganization provisions are founded on the premise that recognition of
gain or loss is inappropriate because the investor holds only a continuing interest in the
enterprise, albeit in a new form, the presence of uncertainty and risk in the reorganization
sufficient to compel the use of contingent consideration strongly indicates that the invest-
ment is not merely continuing in a new form. Instead, the presence of contingent consider-
ation indicates a radical revision of interests. Therefore, it may appear that nonrecognition
is inappropriate.
No attempt will be made here to respond to this radical challenge to the reorganization
provisions; it is sufficient to note that there may well be exogenous policy considerations
which justify the reorganization scheme.
269. 315 U.S. 194 (1942). See notes 19-33 supra and accompanying text.
270. Eg., Treas. Reg. § 1.354-1(e) (1955).
[Vol. 29:88
TREATMENT OF CONTINGENT CONSIDEPATION
as stock for the purposes of section 354.271 If the Service withdrew
that revenue procedure and announced that contingent and es-
crowed stock would be permitted to the extent that they were jus-
tified by a business purpose and that the transactions involving the
acquisition of closely held corporations with provision for a con-
tinuation of management would be subject to special guidelines,
much of the problem could be cured. Similarly, if the regulations
under sections 354 and 356 were amended to provide that stock
warrants would qualify as stock for the application of those provi-
sions, Southwest Consolidated would be effectively confined to its
facts. The only aspect of the current law which needs reform that
could not be reached administratively is the qualification of voting
stock warrants in B and C reorganizations, and the failure to qual-
ify warrants in those contexts will, of course, inject a measure of
inconsistency in the law. But the majority of problems could be
solved, doctrinally, by action of the Service.
D. Practice in the Interim
The problems of the taxation of contingent consideration are
largely doctrinal and theoretical problems. The current guidelines
for the use of convertible preferred stock and contingent and es-
crowed stock permit a wide variety of contingent consideration.
As a practical matter there are undoubtedly few acquisitions
which fail because of uncertainty which cannot be resolved be-
cause of tax reasons. At the same time, because the revenue pro-
cedures governing contingent and escrowed stock are so restrictive
and because most practitioners do not apply for rulings which fall
outside those limits, a brief review of the probable limits for con-
tingent consideration, as they would be understood by courts, is
valuable.
Three principles emerge. First, any attempt to employ stock
warrants in a reorganization will be risky, at best. Because of the
continued vitality of Southwest Consolidated, warrants remain to-
day a forbidden form of contingent consideration.272 Second, the
most flexible and safest form of contingent consideration is con-
vertible preferred stock. So long as an interest can properly be
characterized as convertible preferred, there is little likelihood of
challenge. Precisely what the boundary is between stock warrants
271. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568; Treas. Reg. § 1.354-1(e) (1955); see notes
34-45 supra and accompanying text.
272. 315 U.S. 194 (1942); Rev. RuL 78-408, 1978-47 I.R.B. 11.
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and convertible preferred is not clear. For example, if a share of
preferred stock entitles the holder to convert to common at a fixed
price plus one-half of the difference between the market price and
the fixed price, is this convertible preferred or convertible pre-
ferred with an attached stock warrant? How a court would resolve
this puzzle cannot be safely predicted.
Third, although the Service limits the available use of contin-
gent and escrowed stock, the courts would probably adopt far
more flexible rules for such devices. If a suitable business purpose
dictated the structure of a transaction, it appears unlikely that
(a) a maximum number of shares must be determined;
(b) the shares must be issued within five years;
(c) fifty percent must be issued initially; and
(d) dividends must be initially payable.
Of course, the business purpose must justify each and every fea-
ture of the contingent stock. But it is hard to believe that a court
would tax the payout of contingent shares over a period not to
exceed the period of litigation on a matter of substantial import
even if that litigation drew out beyond five years; or, with respect
to payment of dividends, if the dividends were paid into escrow to
fund dissenters' rights. Of course, violating any of these Service
guidelines will require counsel to look very closely at the sub-
stance and the purpose of the contingent consideration. For the
counsel willing and able to undertake such scrutiny, it ought to be
easily possible to extend the use of contingent and escrowed stock
beyond the controlling revenue procedures,273 even without re-
form.
2 7 4
273. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
274. See B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 8, 114.56, at 14-143.
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